Productivity and firm size in India

Are smaller firms more productive? Intuitively, while small firms have the advantage of more flexible management and lower response time to market changes, larger firms have the advantages of economies of scale, political clout and better access to government credits, contracts and licenses, particularly in developing countries. Using a panel dataset from a commercially available database of financial statements of manufacturing firms in India, we find that firms in the lowest quintile of the asset distribution that invest in research and have better liquidity are most productive. The Indian manufacturing sector, characterized by both large scale public and private firms as well as numerous smaller firms, provides an ideal setting. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of size, alternative estimation methods and alternative estimates of total factor productivity.     

A Learning-Based Theory of Joint Venture Life-Cycles

We provide a two period, learning-based model of joint venture formation and breakdown. We show that depending on parameter values different dynamic patterns emerge. If the rate of learning is low, then a joint venture forms in both the periods. If the rate of learning is large, then the outcome may either involve joint venture breakdown, or delayed joint venture formation.     

Borrower Targeting under Microfinance Competition with Motivated Microfinance Institutions and Strategic Complementarity

We examine how increased competition among motivated microfinance institutions (MFIs) impacts the poorest borrowers' access to microfinance. We find that competition depends on inequality, technology, and the possibility of double‐dipping (borrowing from several sources). Without competition, even a motivated MFI may lend to the not‐so‐poor in preference to poor borrowers. If double‐dipping is feasible, competition may encourage lending to the poor. The presence of double‐dipping is critical for MFI competition to have a positive effect. When double‐dipping is feasible, MFI coordination may worsen borrower targeting whenever inequality is intermediate. We discuss policy implications dealing with double‐dipping, MFI coordination, and competition.     

Non-dictatorial public distribution rules

Review of Economic Design - This paper considers an exchange economy with no individual endowment where agents have classical quasi-linear preferences and the total available resources are to be...