Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences and with a measure space of agents

We report a generalization of Aumann's (1966) existence theorem to economies without ordered preferences and with externalities in consumption. Our work can alternatively be viewed as a generalization of the Shafer–Sonnenschein (1975) theorem to economies with a continuum of agents.     

SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS: THE CASE OF ALL-EQUITY FIRMS

Three theories have been widely proposed to explain the significant negative market response to the announcement of a new equity issue. By observing a similar negative effect in a sample of zero and near zero long-term debt firms, we are able to conclude that the capital structure hypothesis is not the sole explanation. Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns against subsequent cashflow change while controlling for price pressure effects provide evidence in support of the information hypothesis. Decomposition of the sample by issue purpose reveals a differential impact at the time of announcement consistent with an information-based explanation.     

Managing International Distribution Channel Partners: A Cross-Cultural Approach

Although the topic of conflict has been extensively studied in the distribution channels literature from a domestic perspective, there is relatively little published research examining the construct within the international distribution channels context. This is of particular concern because cross-national channel partnerships are on the rise, and divergent cultures may engender heightened conflict, which has a deleterious effect on channel performance. This article explores the extent to which different channel leadership styles, predicated on Hofstede's dimensions of national culture, can be effective strategies to manage conflict in international distribution channels. Specifically, the article examines whether the relationship between leadership style and conflict in international distribution channels is moderated by national culture. Additionally, the impact of manifest conflict on international channel partner performance is investigated. A conceptual model and research propositions are developed. The use of leadership styles to manage disagreements among international channel partners is argued to be culturally specific. International channel management implications and directions for future research are suggested.     

Governing business process offshoring: Properties,processes, and preferred modes

This article examines an important yet understudied issue—the governance mode for business process offshoring (BPO). By applying transaction cost economics and organizational control perspective in the global BPO context, we suggest that BPO's governance mode (foreign captive, joint venture, and independent vendor) is determined by task features, such as knowledge specialization, information security, and process codifiability, and by needed process integration, horizontally between departments and units within the provider and vertically between the provider and its global client and its local subcontractor. Findings from our analysis of 308 global BPO units in India and China confirm our hypotheses.     

Competition In Mediation Services: Modeling the Role of Expertise,Satisfaction, and Switching Costs

This article analyzes competition among mediation service providers that match clients and vendors in a horizontally differentiated market. This is an issue that is important for decision support of mediators in determining pricing and service strategies. We present a simulation model to simultaneously represent search as well as the behaviors of clients, vendors, and multiple competing mediators. Among our findings: intermediaries find it optimal to offer registration fee incentives and derive revenues from transaction fees from successful matches; as switching costs increase, incumbent utilities increase and entrant utilities decrease; expertise, modeled as the ability of mediators to assess vendor attributes accurately, is a powerful competitive weapon for entrants to erode the incumbent intermediary's first mover advantage. On the other hand, client satisfaction is an instrument for an incumbent intermediary to deter entrance by competitors.     

A Knowledge-Based Explanation of Franchise System Resources and Performance

The knowledge-based view (KBV) holds that the knowledge that an organization possesses is its most important strategic resource. Despite how important the adequate use of knowledge is to franchise system success, the KBV has yet to guide many franchising studies. The most important principle of KBV is to recognize system-wide resources through the eyes of knowledge-based resources. Using two separate secondary data sets, we examine the relationships between the knowledgeable employment of system resources and system performance. Empirical results reveal consistent support for our hypotheses. The ensuing discussion focuses on the implications of our findings.     

Effect of purchase volume flexibility and purchase mix flexibility on e-procurement performance: An analysis of two perspectives

Despite the widespread adoption of e-procurement by firms in recent years, academic research examining the mechanisms through which e-procurement applications lead to performance has been scarce. Anecdotal evidence points to numerous situations where companies have failed to harness the potential of e-procurement. In this paper, we argue that online purchase volume and mix flexibilities facilitated by these applications play a significant role in the ability of firms to benefit from e-procurement. We examine this tenet from both an economic as well as a social perspective. We propose that increased online purchase volume flexibility as well as online purchase mix flexibility can be facilitated by two mechanisms – supplier customization as explained by transaction costs perspective, and information sharing between supply chain partners using a social exchange theoretical perspective. The increased purchase volume and mix flexibility in turn leads to better performance along the dimensions of cost, quality, and delivery. We present and test a nuanced perspective where we argue that (i) the effect of supplier customization on both purchase volume and mix flexibilities will be moderated by the frequency of transactions conducted online, and (ii) the effect of information sharing on both purchase volume and mix flexibilities will be moderated by trust in the supplier. We estimate our research model using survey data collected from 130 purchasing and procurement managers. We find strong support for our proposed research model with results indicating that purchase volume and mix flexibilities play a vital mediating role in impacting e-procurement performance. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Third world multinationals : The characteristics of Indian firms investing abroad

This paper uses models of dichotomous choice to distinguish the characteristics of Indian firms that invest overseas from those that do not. It seeks to shed light on the motivations underlying foreign investment by Indian firms and on the nature of the perceived competitive advantage of these firms in their overseas operations.     

A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibriumcoalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp forsymmetricpartition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D62.