The Incidence of Pension Contributions: A Panel Based Analysis of the Impact of Pension Contributions on Labor Cost,Wages and Labor Supply

De Economist - One of the key elements in the planned pension reform in the Netherlands is to abolish the implicit subsidy from younger to older workers inherent in pension schemes with age...     

Factor exposures and diversification: Are sustainably screened portfolios any different?

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - We analyze the performance, risk, and diversification characteristics of global screened and best-in-class equity portfolios constructed according to...     

Response Surface Regressions for Critical Value Bounds and Approximate p-values in Equilibrium Correction Models1

We consider the popular ‘bounds test’ for the existence of a level relationship in conditional equilibrium correction models. By estimating response surface models based on about 95 billion simulated F-statistics and 57 billion t-statistics, we improve upon and substantially extend the set of available critical values, covering the full range of possible sample sizes and lag orders, and allowing for any number of long-run forcing variables. By computing approximate P-values, we find that the bounds test can be easily oversized by more than 5 percentage points in small samples when using asymptotic critical values.     

The pricing accuracy of alternative equity valuation models: Scandinavian evidence

In many decision contexts, there is a need for benchmark equity valuations, based on simplified modeling and publicly available information. Prior research on U.S. data however shows that the accuracy of such valuation models can be low and sensitive to the choice of model specifications and value driver predictions. In this paper, we test the applicability and pricing accuracy of three fundamental valuation (dividend discount, residual income, and abnormal earnings growth) models, all based on forecasts of company dividends, earnings, and/or equity book values. Extending prior research, we apply these models to Scandinavian firms with accounting data from the period 2005–2014, explicitly testing two approaches for the prediction of the value drivers—exogenously forecasted numbers versus projected historical numbers. Given access to the forecasted value drivers, the dividend discount model comes out as the most accurate valuation model. In particular, this holds in a comparison between the most parsimonious model specifications. The residual income valuation model generates the best pricing accuracy given the prediction of value drivers based on historical financial numbers. Notably, we observe pricing errors that in general are lower than what has been reported in prior U.S.‐based research for the dividend discount and the residual income valuation models. The pricing accuracy of the abnormal earnings growth models is surprisingly weak in the Scandinavian setting. However, these models improve somewhat after a couple of complexity adjustments, in particular with value driver predictions based on the projected history setting.     

Mean‐field games with differing beliefs for algorithmic trading

Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogeneous agents, who disagree on what model the real world follows, optimize their trading actions. The market has latent factors that drive prices, and agents account for the permanent impact they have on prices. This leads to a large stochastic game, where each agents performance criteria are computed under a different probability measure. We analyze the mean‐field game (MFG) limit of the stochastic game and show that the Nash equilibrium is given by the solution to a nonstandard vector‐valued forward–backward stochastic differential equation. Under some mild assumptions, we construct the solution in terms of expectations of the filtered states. Furthermore, we prove that the MFG strategy forms an ε‐Nash equilibrium for the finite player game. Finally, we present a least square Monte Carlo based algorithm for computing the equilibria and show through simulations that increasing disagreement may increase price volatility and trading activity.     

On the functioning of a capacity market with an increasing share of renewable energy

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Capacity auctions with reliability options are seen as a promising possibility to reduce the investment risk for electricity generators as well as to set...     

The Effects of Germany's Statutory Minimum Wage on Employment and Welfare Dependency

In January 2015, Germany introduced a federal, statutory minimum wage of 8.50 € per hour. This study evaluates the effects of this policy on regular and marginal employment and on welfare dependency. Based on the county‐level administrative data, this study uses the difference‐in‐differences technique, exploiting regional variation in the bite of the minimum wage, i.e., the county‐specific share of employees paid less than 8.50 € before the introduction of the minimum wage. The minimum wage had a considerable negative effect on marginal employment. There is also some indication that regular employment was slightly reduced. Concerning welfare dependency, the minimum wage reduced the number of working welfare recipients, with some indication that about one half of them left welfare receipt due to the minimum wage.     

PARTY CUES,POLITICAL TRENDS,AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Recent theoretical and empirical research has suggested that similarities in party affiliations across space will alter voters' comparisons, thus influencing fiscal policy mimicking. We employ a two‐regime spatial panel data model applied to U.S. state governors from 1970 to 2012, and find rather weak empirical evidence of influence of political party affiliations in fiscal yardstick competition. Our observed cross‐state interdependence in fiscal policies suggests voters may not weigh party affiliation heavily in their measure of comparative quality, treating each incumbent individually and independently. Incumbents strategically choose policy accordingly. This provides indirect support for the median voter theorem, in which incumbents' objective function is to maximize votes, independent of political affiliation. (JEL D72, H2, H7)     

Economic reforms and labour markets: policy issues and lessons from Chile

Over the last twenty years sweeping reforms have deeply transformed the labour market in Chile. A visible outcome has been the reduction of Chile's rate of unemployment from 'European' to 'US' levels. Even though the political context makes this experiment special, are there economic lessons to be learnt? This paper concentrates on reforms to job security, on the decentralization of the wage bargaining process, and on the reduction in payroll taxes. It concludes that the reduction of payroll taxes (within the context of the social security reform), and the decentralization of bargaining increased labour market flexibility and contributed to the reduction of unemployment. On the other side, the analysis suggests that the reform on job security had no significant effect on the aggregate rate of unemployment.     

Who needs experts most? Board industry expertise and strategic change—a contingency perspective

Research summary: We analyze the effects of board industry expertise on corporate strategic change and the moderating role of institutional quality. We suggest that country‐level contingency factors mitigate the effect of experienced boards on strategy formation by providing alternative sources of information and control in strategic matters. We develop institutional quality as institutional information provision and institutional control provision to test our hypotheses on a sample of firms from MSCI Europe and the S&P 500. Our findings confirm that industry expertise is a salient driver of strategic change across countries. The strength of the effect, however, depends on the institutional quality. We submit that weak institutions require greater board industry expertise as an alternative channel of information and control. Management summary: This study provides new empirical evidence that experience in the firms' industries enables directors to increase strategic change. Our findings show that this effect is even stronger in countries with weak regulatory environments. We hereby provide guidance for multiple stakeholders. First, shareholders seeking a more active adjustment of their firms' strategies may want to compose boards that leverage such experienced directors. Second, directors can use their industry experience to control and to challenge managers better to move beyond the status quo. Third, managers lacking access to information on potential strategic change can use such experienced directors for strategic advice and as a source of information. Overall, we add to the understanding of the corporate board's role in shaping strategy and the influence of weak regulations. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.