EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS, FIRM SIZE, AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF STOCK PRICES

The notion that prices impound a wide array of information, including market expectations, has led to earnings forecast models conditioned on prices. Yet, presumably, analysts' forecasts capture both public information and certain private information not previously impounded in prices. Accordingly, price-based models are seemingly an inefficient, and less effective, source of expecta-tions. This article investigates this hypothesis using financial analysts', price-based, and naive forecasts. Results indicate that analysts' forecasts (1) are at least as accurate as price-based and naive models, and (2) yield better expectations for market tests relating returns and earnings. These inferences are robust across different information environments. The evidence suggests that analysts either possess private information or are more effective information processors, or both.     

A Comparison of Cost of Equity Estimates of Local and Global CAPMs

Cost of equity estimates are compared for three pricing models: the traditional local CAPM, the single (market) factor global CAPM, and the two‐factor global CAPM, with both market and currency index factors. For 2989 US stocks, the average difference in the cost of equity estimates is about 48 basis points between the local CAPM and the single‐factor global CAPM, and is about 61 basis points between the two global models. For 70 developed‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 76 and 47 basis points, respectively. For 48 emerging‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 57 and 70 basis points.     

Uniform Commercial Policy, Illegal Trade, and the Real Exchange Rate: A Theoretical Analysis

Countries on fixed exchange rates sometimes use uniform tariffcum subsidy (UTCS) schemes as a way of achieving a real depreciationwithout disturbing the nominal exchange rate. A potential drawbackof this policy in relation to an across-the-board devaluationis that a UTCS scheme provides incentives for illegal trade.Using an optimizing model with currency convertibility and illegaltrade. I find that welfare is lower under a UTCS scheme thanunder a corresponding across-the-board devaluation and thatin some cases the real exchange rate actually appreciates inresponse to an increase in the UTCS rate.     

The composition of interest: The judaic prohibition

An interest charge is made up of an award for waiting known as the real rate of interest, a premium for risk and compensation for transaction costs. Where inflation exists the lender seeks further compensation. In order to understand the composition and evolution of different versions of the usury prohibition it is necessary to ask which components of an interest charge are prohibited by each version. The Judaic prohibition has two aspects which are of particular interest to business historians and students of usury. First, the general rule is that a reward for waiting is prohibited. This focuses on the time-based part of interest charge. Second, interest is prohibited because it amounts to placing a stumbling block before the blind. This focuses on the typical gullibility of the borrower confronted by a more expert, better funded lender. Economics confirms and enriches our understanding of these important aspects of the prohibition. They achieve this by increasing our understanding of two facts: first, that the borrower is a gullible individual subject to irrational and inconsistent behaviour; and, second, that this behaviour relates to the waiting aspect of interest which is proscribed in the prohibition. How far these insights apply to other civilisations' prohibition, particularly those which derive from the Judaic prohibition, merits further study; so also do the ethical lessons of the Mosaic rules for a globalised society based on capitalism.     

Combating Corruption in Indonesia? The Ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission

Early optimism that post-Soeharto governments would lead a systematic campaign against corruption has largely been disappointed. The creation of the ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission (KPKPN) were hopeful signs, but both initiatives are symptomatic of the weaknesses besetting Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts. Despite their best endeavours, both organisations have weak powers, are under-resourced, receive only token political support and exist in isolation from other investigative and enforcement agencies. International research suggests that official efforts to eliminate corruption are effective only as part of a coordinated campaign to reform administration, policy making, legislative institutions and the judiciary. Threatened exposure or punishment of corrupt officials is not enough: all the institutional incentives and disincentives for abuse of public office for private gain must be confronted. In Indonesia the problem is that most of those empowered to take such initiatives have no incentive to do so because they profit from the status quo.     

Does an Industry Effect Exist for Initial Public Offerings?

We examine the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on rival firms and find that the valuation effects are insignificant. This insignificant reaction can be explained by offsetting information and competitive effects. Significant positive information effects are associated with IPOs in regulated industries and the first IPO in an industry following a period of dormancy. Significant negative competitive effects are associated with larger IPOs in competitive industries, those in relatively risky industries, those in high‐performing industries, and those in the technology sector. IPO firms that use the proceeds for debt repayment appear to represent a more significant competitive threat to rival firms relative to IPO firms that use their proceeds for other purposes.