The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.     

SUPPLY CHAIN INFORMATION SHARING IN A VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY PARTNERSHIP

Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) involves the vendor making the replenishment decision for products supplied to a customer based on various inventory and supply chain policies. Information sharing between supply chain members is required in VMI. Sometimes VMI decisions are delayed and/or the information shared is inaccurate. This research examines the effects of information delay and accuracy, and the sharing of sales and forecast information in a VMI environment facing stationary and nonstationary demand. The simulation experiments show the impact of information delay, information inaccuracy, and information sharing on a variety of performance measures, including inventory levels and fill rates.     

Dynamics of the federal funds target rate: a nonstationary discrete choice approach

We apply a discrete choice approach to model the empirical behaviour of the Federal Reserve in changing the federal funds target rate, the benchmark of short‐term market interest rates in the US. Our methods allow the explanatory variables to be nonstationary as well as stationary. This feature is particularly useful in the present application as many economic fundamentals that are monitored by the Fed and are believed to affect decisions to adjust interest rate targets display some nonstationarity over time. The chosen model successfully predicts the majority of the target rate changes during the time period considered (1994–2001) and helps to explain strings of similar intervention decisions by the Fed. Based on the model‐implied optimal interest rate, our findings suggest that there is a lag in the Fed's reaction to economic shocks during this period. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS, FIRM SIZE, AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF STOCK PRICES

The notion that prices impound a wide array of information, including market expectations, has led to earnings forecast models conditioned on prices. Yet, presumably, analysts' forecasts capture both public information and certain private information not previously impounded in prices. Accordingly, price-based models are seemingly an inefficient, and less effective, source of expecta-tions. This article investigates this hypothesis using financial analysts', price-based, and naive forecasts. Results indicate that analysts' forecasts (1) are at least as accurate as price-based and naive models, and (2) yield better expectations for market tests relating returns and earnings. These inferences are robust across different information environments. The evidence suggests that analysts either possess private information or are more effective information processors, or both.     

A Comparison of Cost of Equity Estimates of Local and Global CAPMs

Cost of equity estimates are compared for three pricing models: the traditional local CAPM, the single (market) factor global CAPM, and the two‐factor global CAPM, with both market and currency index factors. For 2989 US stocks, the average difference in the cost of equity estimates is about 48 basis points between the local CAPM and the single‐factor global CAPM, and is about 61 basis points between the two global models. For 70 developed‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 76 and 47 basis points, respectively. For 48 emerging‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 57 and 70 basis points.