A sensitivity analysis in a nonlinear Leontief model

Conclusion We have shown that in a nonlinear Leontief model where non-decreasing returns are allowed for, if some elements of the final demand vector are increased, then each activity level (i. e., gross output) goes up or remain unchanged and the maximum rate of increase in activity levels must be realized among those sectors for which the final demand is raised. It is also shown that this maximum rate of increase in activity levels is not greater than the maximum rate of increase in the final demands.It should be noted that we do not require the indecomposability ofA (x). WhenA (x) is indecomposable, the final demand vector can be allowed to be non-zero nonnegative, and we can derive a set of propositions similar to those presented in this article.     

UNCERTAINTY AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO INERTIA

In stock markets, we often observe portfolio inertia, i.e., a situation in which some stocks are not traded or not priced for a few minutes or longer. This is neither an exceptional situation in which some stock price soars too high to be priced, nor the one where some stock price plummets too much to be traded. By introducing the concept of ‘Knightian uncertainty’, Dow and Werlang (1992) account for the existence of portfolio inertia, which has not been accounted for under the concept of ‘risk’. This paper provides a characterization of the spread between buying and selling prices based on a parameter proposed by Ozaki and Streufert (1999, 2001) that enables us to estimate the attitude towards Knightian uncertainty, and shows that an increase (a decrease) in Knightian uncertainty expands (shrinks) the interval in which an investor never changes her initial position. Furthermore, we analyse the effect of an increase in Knightian uncertainty on portfolio inertia based on Epsilon‐contaminations.     

Do collective bargaining institutions crowd out discussion and implementation of firm‐related training programs? Evidence from Japan

The paper empirically examines labor‐management communication concerning in‐house training programs and its relation to the actual on‐ and off‐the‐job training policy and wage structure. Using governmental datasets from Japan, we study how different labor‐management communication institutions may affect the training interests of employers and employees differently. We classify these institutions in terms of whether they have a legal (i.e. statutory) foundation (‘de jure’) or not (‘de facto’). We find that collective bargaining, with legal grounds, may crowd out employees’ willingness to communicate about training. However, the existence of ‘de facto’ communication channels such as joint labor‐management councils or shop floor committees is positively correlated with both on‐ and off‐the‐job of training. At the same time, the existence of unions is positively correlated with the steepness of wage profiles for mid‐career workers, which is consistent with the fact that employers and employees assume a long‐term relationship. Thus, we show that a multi‐tiered structure of labor‐management communication, together with a long‐term orientation toward the employment relationship, contributes to strengthen employees’ voice in training matters.     

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.