Contests with Multi-tasking*

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi‐dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions, and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.     

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: BALANCING THE BIASES?

In the past several years, efforts have been made to introduce the 1993 System of National Accounts (1993) SNA ) in most of the formerly centrally planned economies. In doing so, a number of problems have emerged, some of which are particular to the situation of these countries. Some of these problems will probably cause overestimates of national accounts variables, others will cause underestimates, and it would be purely coincidental if these effects cancel out. This paper discusses the most disconcerting issues in this situation, and possible solutions.     

Guidelines for Corporate Trademark Licensing

Licensing a trademark in many firms, if it occurs at all, is an incidental ad hoc arrangement. An unorganized approach can mean trouble. It can also mean the firm is losing an opportunity to exploit fully a valuable asset. Tom Meyer, Cathie Tinney, and Terry Tinney argue that trademark licensing is deserving of careful attention and planning.     

THE EFFECT OF MARKET PROXY REBALANCING POLICIES ON DETECTING ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE

In this paper, effects on the measured abnormal performance of test portfolios are compared against market proxies having the same or different rebalancing policies. Results show that the common practice of comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with equally weighted market proxies produces lower Jensen [ 7 ] alphas and lower alpha t-values. Comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with value-weighted market proxies produces higher portfolio betas and alphas, but lower alpha t-values. Finally, comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with buy-and-hold market proxies produces the most powerful tests of abnormal performance.     

Consistent choice under uncertainty

Suppose ex post preferences are defined upon prizes and ex ante preferences are defined upon lotteries. Then the consistent choice of decision rules reigns whenever ex post optimality is equivalent to ex ante optimality. This essay provides a necessary and sufficient condition for consistent choice in terms of revealed preferences. Indeed, ex ante revealed preferences must be induced from ex post revealed preferences in a manner which requires them to satisfy the independence axiom from expected utility theory.     

Contingent payments in selection contests

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free. This paper is part of the project “The Knowledge-Based Society” sponsored by the Research Council of Norway (project 172603/V10).