Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods

In a market in which each trader's initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good, there exists an incentive compatible procedure for reaching a competitive allocation. This contrasts with some recent results for similar problems.     

Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post‐season college football bowls

Many markets have “unraveled” and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. It has previously proved difficult, however, to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to 1992, college football teams were matched for post‐season play up to several weeks before the end of the regular season. Since 1992, the market has reorganized to postpone this matching. We show that the matching of teams affects efficiency as measured by the resulting television viewership, and that the reorganization promoted more efficient matching, chiefly as a result of the increased ability of later matching to produce “championship” games.     

Delphic study examines developments in medicine

This experiment with the Delphi forecasting technique correlates the opinions of experts about likely developments in the field of medicine. The study was conducted for a report by Smith Kline & French Laboratories in the USA as an aid to the planning of a pharmaceutical company. Two internal questionnaires encouraged the formulation of an extramural Delphi to probe the future of five areas, biomedical research, diagnosis, medical therapy, health care and medical education. The results of the survey are displayed graphically, and a scenario for the years 1978–1983 has been constructed from the consensus statements.     

Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study extends prior studies by examining how managerial ownership and external unrelated blockholdings affect the informativeness of earnings. The results are in contrast to prior studies. A non–linear relation exists between managerial ownership and earnings informativeness. Earnings informativeness increases with managerial ownership at low levels but not at higher levels of managerial ownership where the entrenchment effect sets in. Consistent with the role of large shareholder monitoring, the evidence shows a strong positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings informativeness. These results are supported when income–increasing and absolute discretionary accruals are used to measure the extent of earnings management     

A cluster analysis of highly productive business and management education scholars

The authors examined the publications and impact of highly productive business and management education (BME) scholars across the business disciplines of accounting, economics, finance, information systems, management, marketing, and operations management. Results from a hierarchical cluster analysis revealed five clusters of scholars: leading BME Scholars, leading discipline-focused BME scholars, high-profile BME scholars, focused BME scholars, and recognized BME scholars. The article includes a discussion of findings and their implications for BME scholarship, future BME scholars, and business schools.     

WHO VOTES EXPRESSIVELY,AND WHY? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Experiments have shown that some people behave more altruistically in collective decisions than they do in individual ones, which could be interpreted as an ‘expressive voting’ effect. However, there is substantial variation in the behaviour of experimental participants. We conduct experiments to explore the reasons for this variation, and find that certain characteristics are sometimes associated with a propensity for expressive voting. However, the strength of these effects depends on the ordering of individual and collective choices. The ‘warm glow’ of expressive voting can influence subsequent individual decisions, and the ‘cold shower’ of individual selfishness can influence subsequent collective decisions.     

Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon

In this paper we use experimental data from rural Cameroon to quantify the effect of social distance on trust and altruism. Our measure of social distance is relevant to everyday economic interactions: subjects in a Trust Game play with fellow villagers or with someone from a different village. We find that significantly more money is sent when the players are from the same village. Other factors that influence transfers at least as much as the same-village effect are gender, education and membership of rotating credit groups. To test whether Senders are motivated by altruism, they also play a Triple Dictator Game. Senders transfer significantly more money on average in the Trust Game than in the Triple Dictator Game. However, there is also a social distance effect in the Triple Dictator Game. Results from a Risk Game suggest that Trust Game transfers are uncorrelated with attitudes to risk.