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951.
The main statements in this article are taken from the report ?Untersuchung der Grundlagen und Entwicklungsperspektiven des Bankensektors in Deutschland ‘ for the Federal Ministry of Finance cf. www.diw.de/deutsch/produkte/publikationen/gutachten/aktuell/index.html. 《Economic Bulletin》2004,41(7):235-238
952.
Andrey D. Ukhov 《The Journal of Financial Research》2004,27(3):329-339
The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm‐value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm‐value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm‐value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided. 相似文献
953.
C. N. V. Krishnan 《The Journal of Financial Research》2004,27(4):461-479
I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment. 相似文献
954.
Dominic Gasbarro Kim‐Song Le Robert G. Schwebach J. Kenton Zumwalt 《The Journal of Financial Research》2004,27(1):133-141
Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both. 相似文献
955.
956.
In this paper we examine variance bound tests of the joint hypothesis that (1) bond markets are efficient and (2) the term structure is determined by the expectations hypothesis. Both the Singleton and Shiller tests are shown to be seriously biased toward rejecting the joint hypothesis in finite samples. Flavin's test is unbiased but has a very high variance leading to many false rejections of the joint hypothesis. When corrected as suggested by Flavin, Shiller's test is unbiased and has a relatively low variance. Unfortunately, it is also sensitive to measurement error. 相似文献
957.
Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes. 相似文献
958.
We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks. 相似文献
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks. 相似文献
959.
960.
Abstract. We experimentally investigate the effects of a mandatory increase in education on the market for professional labor services when several service qualities are assumed to exist. We show that when suppliers have insufficient incentives to offer high-quality services in a free market, an increase in mandatory education can improve the coordination of supplier decisions and increase efficiency. If suppliers voluntarily provide a sufficient quantity of high-quality services, an education constraint can have the opposite effect. In both instances, however, an increase in the mandatory level of education can be expected to reduce the price of high-quality services while increasing the price of lower service qualities. Résumé. Les auteurs ont procédé à une analyse expérimentale des conséquences qu'aurait une hausse imposée du niveau d'études sur le marché des services professionnels, si l'on suppose l'existence de plusieurs qualités de services. L'analyse démontre que lorsque les stimulants sont insuffisants pour inciter les fournisseurs à offrir des services professionnels de qualité supérieure dans un marché libre, une hausse imposée du niveau d'études peut améliorer la coordination des décisions des fournisseurs et augmenter l'efficience. Si toutefois les fournisseurs offrent de leur propre chef une quantité suffisante de services de qualité supérieure, le fait d'imposer un niveau d'études supérieur peut avoir l'effet contraire. Dans les deux cas, on peut s'attendre à ce qu'une hausse du niveau d'études obligatoire réduise le prix des services de qualité supérieure tout en augmentant le prix des services de qualité plus faible. 相似文献