Dynamic linkages among equity markets in the Middle East and North African countries

The relaxation of security laws and regulations in emerging markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provides abundant opportunities for foreign investors. These markets exhibit high-expected returns and substantial volatility. In this paper, we investigate the lead/lag relationship between the MENA countries and regions. We find no market causality or spillover from one country to another in the North Africa region. Our results for the Levant region reveal that there are linkages between stock markets in this region. The results for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region show that there is more interaction and linkage in the GCC region than in the North Africa and Levant regions. An unexpected result is that UAE's stock market leads all the markets in this region. Finally, we investigate linkages among the three regions. We find that GCC influences the other two regions.     

Trade, foreign firms and economic policy in Indonesian and Thai manufacturing

This paper first examines the rapid growth and changing composition of manufactured exports in Indonesia and Thailand, highlighting the rapid growth of office and computer machinery and electric machinery, somewhat slower growth of non-electric and transportation machinery, as well as the low growth of previously large exports of textiles apparel. Second, the important contributions of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) to export growth in the machinery industries, particularly in electric, office, and computing machinery, are documented. Third, the paper describes trade policies in all these industries in some detail, emphasizing how low protection was a key facilitator of rapid export growth in the MNEs that dominated the electric, office, and computing machinery industry, while high protection reduced incentives to export among MNEs in the transportation machinery industry.     

Stability, Asymmetry and Seasonality of Fund Performance: An Analysis of Australian Multi‐sector Managed Funds

Using a sample of Australian Multi-sector trusts we examine selectivity and market timing performance and extend the analysis to include the relatively new measure of volatility timing. This is of particular relevance to our data set, as high levels of volatility persistence are prevalent in Australia. In addition we consider the stability, asymmetry and seasonality of the various performance and risk measures. A survivorship adjustment procedure is also employed in order to assess the impact of survivorship on selectivity, market timing and volatility timing performance.     

The fleeting nature of permanent reinvestment: Accounting for the undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries

Over the last decade, an increasing percentage of the profits reported by U.S. corporations were earned by their foreign subsidiaries and retained outside the United States resulting in the deferral of income taxes. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provided a temporary federal tax incentive to remit such earnings, which resulted in the repatriation of $140 billion by the 30 firms comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average. An analysis of the financial reporting disclosures made by these firms reveals that a tax expense was not fully recognized on a substantial portion of the earnings until repatriation because of an exception for foreign reinvestments deemed to be essentially permanent in duration. The implications of the currently acceptable accounting for undistributed foreign earnings are discussed as well as recommendations to improve the relevancy and reliability of the disclosures required for this exception to comprehensive recognition of deferred taxes.     

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits

This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.     

Hedging,Financing and Investment Decisions: A Simultaneous Equations Framework

We empirically investigate the interactions among hedging, financing, and investment decisions. We argue that the way in which hedging affects a firm's financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth opportunities. We find that high growth firms increase their investment, but not leverage, by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase their leverage.     

Current state of the electrification of Russia

The current progress of electrification in Russia is clearly insufficient compared with G8 countries. At the same time, economy sectors have a high potential for energy saving. The electricity consumption of households depends on their cash income and the growth rate of electricity tariffs.     

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeoversand the source of their advantage. We show how the presenceof arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, sincearbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageurhas the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares.In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares andthe price they pay are determined endogenously. We also presentseveral empirical implications, including the relationship amongtrading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, andthe number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particulardeal.