ASEAN's New Frontiers: Integrating the Newest Members into the ASEAN Economic Community

Since Vietnam, Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar, and Cambodia joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1990s, concerns have been raised over a Development Divide. The real division is between ASEAN members participating in the integrated East Asian economy and those that do not. The older ASEAN members have become more efficient traders, and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam must reform faster if they are to catch up. Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are not meeting the challenge, but Vietnam may be leaving the laggards, and the Philippines is lagging the leaders. The challenge is how to avoid a two‐tier ASEAN with fast‐growing modern economies coexisting besides inward‐looking poor countries.     

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The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed. Price flexibility boosts the positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the negative impact of failing a soft test. As a result, profits are convex in toughness: the firm selects either the toughest or softest test available. The toughest test is optimal when consumers start with an unfavorable prior and receive sufficiently uninformative private signals (an “innovative” product); the softest test is optimal when signals are sufficiently informative.     

Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results during the course of a patent contest. Despite knowledge spillovers, the leading innovator sometimes discloses to signal commitment to the project, and so potentially inducing a rival's exit. Surprisingly, when development costs are low the leading innovator does not need to disclose to induce the same strategic deterrence effect as that which arises from disclosure. Taking into account wasteful duplication of R&D effort, a patent office can increase welfare by choosing the probability of granting a contested patent and so altering the proportion of rivals that the leading innovator deters.