The Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing?

The difference between people's valuations of gains and losses has been widely observed in both single trial and repeated trial experiments, as well as in survey responses and in commonplace behavior. However, the results of some Vickrey auction experiments indicate that the disparity may decrease, or even disappear, over repeated trials. This paper reports the results of two further repeated Vickrey auction experiments that test the impact of both a second price and a ninth price auction rule on valuations. Although valuations should be independent of this variation in the exchange price rule, the manipulation had a dramatic impact on subjects' stated values of a common market good. The results suggest that the endowment effect remains robust over repeated trials, and that contrary to common understanding, the Vickrey auction may elicit differing demands dependent on the context of the valuation.     

采用PRA进行哈尼族地区贫困原因分析

采用参与性农村评估 (PRA)中的问题树和排序等方法 ,对云南省绿春县的哈尼族村寨进行贫困原因分析。结果发现造成该地区贫困的主要原因是 :⑴人口剧增 ,造成耕地不足 ;⑵口粮不够 ,造成对土地的过度开垦 ;⑶经济结构单一 ,土地利用不合理 ,导致森林破坏 ;⑷森林破坏 ,导致水源短缺和水土流失严重 ,进一步减少良田面积 ;⑸水资源管理不合理 ,加剧水源的短缺。针对该地区的实际情况 ,建议发展项目应从环境保护和扶贫相结合的方向发展。     

A note on multiproduct economies of scale and economies of scope

Two measures of (local) economies of scale for a firm producing more than two products are derived using measures of product-specific economies of scale and economics of scope. The latter is especially useful for econometric estimation and testing.     

Financial planning and forecasting models: an overview

This article reviews the past progress of financial planning models and takes a brief look into their future. Mathematical models that can be solved via computers to give financial managers insights into the future are the focus of the discussion.     

On exploiting scale economies

Indivisibilities give rise to scale economies in the provision of many local public services. Exploitation of these scale economies often requires that the activities of several communities be coordinated. In this study we analyze the game analog to a simple waste collection system in order to determine the requirements for the design of a financing system that will sustain optimal participation in a regional service system plan. We find that market based pricing in the face of scale economies created by indivisibilities will generally not support an optimal partition of communities into service districts. We also find that characterization of the game structure of local public service delivery systems is feasible and provides information for designing appropriate cost-sharing arrangements.