Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior

The question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement effort. To be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the current audit and penalty regime. We use laboratory experiments to examine the compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and results. The information includes “official” information disseminated by the tax authority, and “unofficial”, or informal, communications among taxpayers. Our results indicate that the effect of the type of post-audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is well informed of the audit rate prior to filing. We find that the tax authority would be served by pre-announcing audit rates credibly and by emphasizing the previous period audit frequency in annual reporting of enforcement effort.     

Is the relationship between investment and conditional cash flow volatility ambiguous,asymmetric or both?

We investigate the effect of cash flow volatility on investment. Our evidence suggests that financially constrained firms decrease investment (i) when experiencing persistently high volatility; (ii) when experiencing both high volatility and negative cash flow growth realisations; and (iii) when holding low cash levels and experiencing both high volatility and a negative cash flow growth realisations. In financially unconstrained firms, the above effects are either not found or are of relatively low economic importance. Overall, our findings lend support to the financial flexibility literature and tend to contradict predictions of the real options literature.     

Preventing HIV in injection drug users: exploring the tradeoffs between interventions

Injection drug users (IDUs) transmit the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) via both needle sharing and sex. Available interventions for this population have varying costs and effectiveness and focus on different risk behaviors. In this analysis, we look at two interventions. One is inexpensive, broad-based and provides modest risk reductions (street outreach (SO)); the other is narrowly focused, expensive and relatively effective (methadone maintenance). This analysis explores the effects of population risk behavior, intervention effectiveness, intervention costs, and decision constraints when allocating funds between these two interventions to maximize effectiveness. We develop a model of the spread of HIV, dividing IDUs into susceptibles (uninfected) and infectives, and separately portraying sex and injection risk. We simulate the epidemic in New York City for time periods from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and incorporate the behavioral effects of two interventions performed singly or in combination to find the allocation that maximizes the number of infections averted in the IDUs and their noninjecting sex partners, assuming interventions have increasing marginal costs. We find that the optimal allocation nearly always involves spending the maximum allowable amount on SO. This result is largely insensitive to variations in risk parameters, intervention efficacy, or cost. The model's structure, however, makes clear that many factors contribute to this insensitivity, namely the scope of the interventions, the dual drug/sex nature of HIV risk in the population, the asymmetry of sexual risk for men and women, and the potential benefits to nonIDUs.     

Organizational form and environment: an analysis of between‐form and within‐form responses to environmental change

This study extends previous research on organizational adaptation to major environmental shifts by empirically examining the potential constraining effects of organizational form, operationalized using the Miles and Snow typology, on the type of responses enacted as well as the performance effects of the responses. Results indicate that a fit between environmental contingencies and organizational form relates to superior performance. The results also provide support for the idea that organizations systematically move toward the higher‐performing forms for a given environment. Consistent with organizational configuration logic, while these responses lead to performance improvements when a between‐form change is made, they do not necessarily lead to performance improvements when a within‐form change is made. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play. We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially difficult environment for learning subgame perfection. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D64, J52