The Myth of the Unscrupulous Energy User’s Dilemma: Evidence from Switzerland

Heating and warm water consumption are frequently billed based on actual consumption, and this approach can be assumed to provide a financial incentive to energy consumers to opt for energy-conserving behaviour (e.g., reducing the room temperature or using warm water economically). In many multi-flat buildings in Switzerland, tenants and homeowners still receive a heating and warm water bill that is based on a flat rate that depends on the size of the dwelling, rather than a bill that is based on the amount of energy actually consumed. In such a situation, there may be a social dilemma that leads to non-cooperative behaviour; economic theory predicts that households would choose a strategy of not sacrificing their level of comfort and, therefore, would not opt for energy-conserving behaviour. Psychological theory, on the other hand, suggests that a change in billing type might not, in and of itself, be a sufficient motivator to promote energy-conserving behaviour. This study aims to gain insight into Swiss consumers’ underlying motivations in conserving energy. It empirically tests whether and how a difference in billing type affects consumers’ current stated energy behaviour and their stated intention to conserve energy in the future. In neither of two separate studies was there any evidence of such a possible unscrupulous energy user’s dilemma. Thus, on its own, consumption-based billing might not lead to significant changes in consumer behaviour. However, it could constitute an essential part of a wider behaviour modification programme that includes more effective billing and direct feedback programmes.     

The value of information in monotone decision problems

We study the information preferences and information demand of decision-makers facing uncertainty. We focus on monotone decision problems in which the posterior beliefs induced by the decision-maker’s information can be ordered so that higher actions are chosen in response to higher signal realizations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for decision makers with different classes of payoff functions to prefer one information structure to another. We also provide conditions under which two decision-makers in a given class can be ranked in terms of their information demand. Applications and examples are given.     

I thought it was over,but now it is back: customer reactions to <Emphasis Type="Italic">ex post</Emphasis> time extensions of sales promotions

In many industries, it is common practice to extend sales promotions ex post. That is, firms belatedly extend the initial deadline of a promotion shortly before or directly after the previously announced deadline, with the expectation of increased sales. Four experimental studies indicate both positive and negative effects of these ex post extensions. First, customers perceive an ex post extended promotional offer as less attractive, such that their repurchase intentions diminish. This negative effect arises consistently across different boundary conditions, such as different customer and product types. Second, the positive effect of ex post extensions stems from the possibility that the consumer can still use the promotional offer, so it emerges only for potential customers and existing customers of frequently bought products. Companies can mitigate the dark side of ex post extensions proactively, by designing the extensions to last for only a short time or offering an explanation for the extension that highlights the popularity of the initial promotion.     

Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions

Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey in J Finance 16(1):8–37, 1961), but repeated experimental studies find more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional probability of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy—despite the fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders—but respond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incentives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations than most of the existing models we consider.     

Dynamite Regulations. The Explosives Industry,Regulatory Capture and the Swedish Government 1858-1948

In this article, we argue that the regulation of the explosives industry in Sweden between 1858 and 1948 can give a slightly different perspective on regulatory capture. In this case it was the upstart company, the Nobel Dynamite Company, and not the established explosives companies that in negotiation with the regulator succeeded in establishing new national regulations. Through three different cases we show that the method behind this successful capture was indirect and direct with a common trait of risk minimizing for the public that developed in cooperation with the regulator.     

GENDER, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT IN AGRICULTURE

The authors analyze the impacts of Southern Latin America integration on Brazilian agriculture. The first part describes the creation of MERCOSUL and its consequences on Brazilian agriculture. Two types of effects are investigated: how MERCOSUL may have induced improvements in the level of competitiveness of the local production of wheat; and the strategies for productive reintegration developed by wheat producers and other economic agents. Some conclusions are presented discussing agricultural diversification as an alternative to economic integration in southern Latin America.     

What Determines Public Support for Affirmative Action?

We present a public higher-education finance model in which demand for education can exceed supply because of indivisibilities in educational investment. In such situations, a screening mechanism—which may exhibit a selection system bias—is required for allocation. We show how changes in the education premium and the test score gap between the minority and the majority might affect political support for affirmative action. When the education premium is relatively low, the matching efficiency gains provided by affirmative action are high compared with the opportunity cost of not acquiring education, and the majority supports affirmative action. When the education premium is high, the opportunity cost of not getting educated is high relative to the matching efficiency gains provided by affirmative action policies, and the majority's support for affirmative action is weaker. In contrast, a higher test score bias has a generally ambigious effect on the majority's political support. If the test score bias is sufficiently large, however, the majority does support affirmative action.     

What health care cost crisis?

Managed care has inherent limitations that, perhaps out of desperation for some degree of control of health care costs, we tend to disregard. A better understanding of the "crisis" and a host of new strategies become apparent when we separately consider the health care elements and cost elements of the crisis. Managed care is essentially palliative in that it eases symptoms without curing conditions. While this is not a call for the abandonment of managed care, it is a warning that our efforts will prove futile if we do not also address other fundamental elements of impaired health.