Demystifying Fair Trade in France: The History of an Ambiguous Project

In France, Fair Trade arrived on the scene in the late twentieth century, and since then has passed through several experimental phases before becoming an enduring “realistic” economic alternative. To understand the transformation, this article defines Fair Trade as a social construct issues and tensions of which change depending on the point of entry. By conducting a secondary analysis of several data sets from varied sources, including documentary material, interviews, and observations, the authors trace the history of Fair Trade in France, define its introduction as a system, describe its institutionalization, and contribute to a greater understanding of how its ideals have changed and become more professional over time. The analyses reveal that the term “Fair Trade” has become ambiguous, spanning divergent and conflicting ideas and projects, including opening and closing conventional market systems and alter-globalization and anti-globalization.     

The strategic strength of weak signal analysis

Foresight can be seen as a social cognition process involving a complex set of methods and interactive processes intended to assist policy in becoming more adaptive and forward-oriented in unpredictable environments. As a form of foresight raw material, “weak signals” can be thought of as gross, unstructured, fragmented, incomplete and inadvertent environmental data that may be refined into valuable information regarding context and further be articulated into strategically actionable knowledge. As advanced indicators that precede significant discrete one-off events and/or novel developments in the rate and direction of trends, their analysis has the potential to facilitate the real-time alignment between organisational decision-making and changing external circumstances. These predictors of future change pose fundamental problems of identification and interpretation and represent a challenge to established mental models. Thus, the practical significance of weak signals is that they can be transformed into meaningful insight for policy action. Such a value, however, does not materialise automatically. Realising this potential requires a degree of tolerance and fluidity of the collective cognitive frameworks by which weak signals can be apprehended, assessed and acted upon. This paper aims at covering the scope of perceptions and actions typically involved in the tracing and tracking of this shaping process.     

Knowledge of campaign finance regulation reduces perceptions of corruption

We use an experimental survey design to measure how campaign finance regulation influences perceptions of political corruption and trust in politicians when citizens are exposed to information about regulation. Unlike most observational studies, results of this experimental study suggest that knowledge of campaign finance regulation substantially reduces citizens’ perceptions of corruption but has only limited effect on trust in politicians. Findings have crucial implications for public policy. At a time when public cynicism about politics is high, a significant reduction in perceptions of political corruption through successful dissemination of campaign finance regulation would be a boost to the legitimacy of democracies.     

Volunteerism,compassion and religiosity as drivers of donations practices

• The topic of donations is one of high relevance and has been widely covered in contemporary marketing literature. It is a topic of interest to both theoreticians and practitioners alike, particularly due to its implicit links to fundraising activities and research. The reality of what makes an individual donor ultimately part with his money and give it away to a nonprofit organization is a hot contemporary topic. This study looks into the role of religiosity as a predictor of donations practices. Also volunteerism and compassion, two acts of pro‐social behaviour are analysed as predictors of donations practices. Using data collected from a survey of 612 charity donors in Portugal, the results show unequivocally that religiosity does influence donations practices, and so being a predictor of donations practices. Moreover, pro‐social behaviour is a predictor of donations practices when in the case of volunteerism, but not in the form of compassion.
• The findings are particularly useful for nonprofit organizations that want to attract and retain individual charitable donors and may also help to increase donation regularity, to obtain higher amounts, and donations both to religious and to secular organizations. Finally, it can be stated that the understanding of religiosity sheds light on knowledge about donations practices, and that this study also makes an important contribution to academia, as it is the first study conducted in Portugal that assesses the drivers of donations practices.

Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TO DIVERSIFY CONTRACTUAL RISK*

Are hedging transactions that diversify a manager’s compensation risk detrimental to incentives, or can they improve contracting efficiency? If hedging provides efficiency benefits, should the manager or the firm undertake it? In our model, both the firm and the manager can trade financial portfolios to diversify the manager’s compensation risk. Prior to the portfolio selection, the parties need to acquire information on how different financial portfolios fit their diversification purposes. We illustrate that financial portfolios correlated with firm‐specific risk improve contracting efficiency. For equal information costs, it is optimal for the firm to undertake the hedging on the manager’s behalf.     

When Feedback Interventions Backfire: Why Higher Performance Feedback May Result in Lower Self‐Perceived Competence and Satisfaction with Performance

In relative performance evaluation systems, appraisers may choose to adopt stricter or laxer evaluation criteria. When laxer (vs. stricter) criteria are used, higher absolute performance evaluations become easier (vs. harder) to achieve. Thus, each appraisee's absolute performance feedback and the mean of the distribution of absolute performance feedback are shifted upward (vs. downward). Yet, relative performance remains constant. When evaluation outcomes depend solely on relative performance, can the adoption of laxer (vs. stricter) criteria—leading to higher absolute performance feedback but no change in relative performance—influence appraisees’ satisfaction with performance? Despite the ubiquity of such systems in organizations, research has not addressed this question. This article points to an important gap between practitioners’ beliefs and research findings. We show that while most appraisers believe that higher absolute performance feedback will automatically result in more satisfaction with performance, the opposite may also happen. Specifically, we find that appraisees with a stronger (vs. weaker) chronic or contextual need to engage in social comparison are more satisfied with lower (vs. higher) absolute performance feedback. Overall, we demonstrate why and how feedback interventions in relative performance evaluation systems may backfire, and suggest a set of practical guidelines for maximizing appraisees’ satisfaction with performance in such systems. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The burden of glory: Competing for nonmonetary incentives in rank‐order tournaments

In an environment in which elite, highly paid professionals compete for nonmonetary rewards, we find evidence of underperformance. Our analysis suggests that choking under pressure from high‐stakes nonmonetary rewards is behind the underperformance. This implies that high stakes nonmonetary rewards can create meaningful pressure on individuals and lead to worse performance, a distinct issue that has yet to be adequately examined. These findings come from an examination of the behavior of top U.S. golfers competing to earn a place on the U.S. Ryder Cup team via their performance in PGA Tour tournaments with differing allocations of Ryder Cup qualifying points.     

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK

This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an oral outcry auction where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is different in each type of auction, but also that (ii) this difference in bidding behaviour does not affect significantly the auction prices. This lends some support to the equivalence between these two types of auction. The winner's curse is present: overbidding led to higher than expected prices (under Nash bidding strategies) in both types of auction. Although interesting and encouraging, the results clearly indicate that further research is necessary, particularly with a modified experimental design.