提高轮胎硫化机抽真空系统稳定性的实现

本文分析了硫化机抽真空系统频繁波动、瓦解产生的具体原因,并根据上述原因提出多种对策解决方案,并择优组织实施,最终有效提高了轮胎硫化工序硫化机抽真空系统稳定性,极大的保障了生产过程的正常运行与产品品质的稳定。     

A note on contribution games with loss functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.     

Competition for Power and Altruism

The paper analyzes the trade-off between power and altruism by using an experimental framework which involved a group of experimental agents, undergraduate students of the University of Siena. The results show that the introduction into the experimental structure of a tournament for the power appreciably altered the behaviour of agents. More specifically the degree of altruism, measured by the dictator offers, significantly decreased when the agents were able to trade altruism for power. The results were more clear-cut and robust in the case of the dictator game, but also in the case of the ultimatum game the introduction of the tournament for power altered the behavior of subjects. A significant gender effect emerged.     

如何建立企业顾客抱怨管理体系

<正>一、分析顾客抱怨的原因及对企业的影响导致顾客抱怨的因素是多种多样,因事而异,因人而异,但总的来说可以归纳为以下两个方面: 1.产品问题导致顾客抱怨。由于产品问题引起的顾客抱怨以致投诉是一种常见的顾客不满的表达形式,如您购买的冰霜不到半年就发生不制冷现象,或刚买的衣服第一次穿就掉了钮扣等。产品问题的产生,可以归因于3方面的责任:一是生产者的责     

Network Interaction with Material and Relational Goods: An Exploratory Simulation

We model interaction within the members of a work group, who carry on different projects and can choose to cooperate with each other or to exploit the work of the others. We focus our attention on the dynamic interdependence between their material performance and the structure of the relations among them. In particular, we assume that their satisfaction depends both upon the material outcome of their projects and upon the quality of their reciprocal relations (so that these two aspects are seen, to a certain extent, as psychological substitutes). As dissatisfaction may generate the disruption of social links, the consequent failure of the projects is a possible outcome. In turn, satisfactory relations and stable cooperation may loop positively together. Our model merges game theory and network representation of the relations among actors, thus opening a route of research that, to our knowledge, has not yet been explored.     

Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison

We estimate private benefits of control in 39 countries using 393 controlling blocks sales. On average the value of control is 14 percent, but in some countries can be as low as ?4 percent, in others as high a +65 percent. As predicted by theory, higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatizations. We also analyze what institutions are most important in curbing private benefits. We find evidence for both legal and extra‐legal mechanisms. In a multivariate analysis, however, media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominating factors.     

Consumption insurance and entrepreneurial risk: Evidence from Italian micro-data

Using cross-sectional data from the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth, we make an attempt to assess the relevance of entrepreneurial risk, i.e., idiosyncratic risk borne by firm owners while running their operations. Our new testing procedure will show that progressively more articulated forms of entrepreneurship do not enjoy a larger degree of risk sharing and will suggest some links between a larger or smaller degree of consumption insurance and variables such as net wealth, asset holding, and net indebtedness. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the corresponding institutions.     

A new formula on a particular type of «Gambler's ruin» problem withN players

The «gambler's ruin» problem both in the fair game and in the unfair game with two players is a classical one. Some results are known also for a fair ruin game among more than two players. In this note an unfair ruin game among more than two players is tackled and a new formula is derived.

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Riassunto Il problema della rovina in un gioco (equo o non) tra due giocatori è classico. Alcuni risultati sono noti per un gioco equo di rovina tra più di due giocatori.In questa nota un gioco non equo di rovina tra più di due giocatori è preso in considerazione, ricavando per esso una nuova formula.

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Work performed under the auspices of GNAFA, Italian C.N.R.     

Beyond profitability: effects of acquisitions on technical efficiency in the Italian pasta industry

Unlike traditional studies on the impact of ownership changes—which use either profitability measures or stock prices—this paper investigates the impact of acquisitions on acquired firms' technical efficiency. Using a panel of Italian firms in the pasta industry for the 1981–1997 period, I estimate a stochastic production frontier with exogenous factors affecting efficiency in a translog specification with non‐neutral technical progress. The main result is that acquired firms experience, within the 6 years period following the acquisition, an increase in technical efficiency of the order of 10%. This result is statistically significant and proves to be robust with respect to the inclusion of size and calendar year effects as explanatory variables of firms' inefficiency. These findings contribute to the debate on the welfare gains of ownership changes by providing evidence that mergers and acquisitions lead to cost savings, due to the reduction of acquired firms' X‐inefficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.