Predicting workload requirements for scheduled health care services, with an application to radiology departments.

A model is developed for predicting workload requirements for scheduled health care services. The model is then applied to an actual planning problem for a radiology department. The probability distribution of future workload is represented by the convolution of two families of random variables such that a compound Poisson process adequately describes workload requirements. The model developed herein can be applied to a wide assortment of capacity-expansion problems that are characterized by discrete demands (e.g. number of jobs) occurring in a given period of time, where the amount of time needed to complete each job is a continuous random variable.     

Proof of nonparticipation in a price fixing conspiracy

When a group of firms colludes on price, the industry price will rise even when there are some firms that do not participate in the conspiracy. If the government or private parties file antitrust suits, the noncolluders face the problem of establishing their innocence since their prices rise along with those of the colluders. We propose a simple output test. Under various models of oligopoly pricing—Bertrand, Cournot, and Stackelberg—we show that the colluders restrict their output while the noncolluders take advantage of the higher price by expanding their outputs. Thus, distinguishing between colluders and noncolluders involves simply observing the output behavior of the industry members.The authors appreciate the support of the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida. We regret that B&R Associates is purely imaginary as is the industry.     

Subjective evaluations of n-person games

Using an axiomatization of subjective expected utility due to Fishburn, we characterize a class of utility functions over a set of n-person games in characteristic-function form. A probabilistic value is defined as the expectation of some player's marginal contribution with respect to some probability measure on the set of coalitions of other players. We decribe conditions under which a utility function on the set of n-person games is a probabilistic value; we prove as well an analogous result for simple games. We present additional axioms that characterize the semivalues and, in turn, the Shapley and Banzhaf values.     

The Politics of Government Pricing: Political Influences on Rate Structures of Publicly-owned Electric Utilities

Abstract . Although theoretical analysis of publicly-owned enterprises is rapidly evolving into a well established body of literature, parallel empirical work is scarce. A major cause of this imbalance is the difficulty of quantifying theoretically important concepts such as political influence or political power. The purpose of this paper is to narrow the gap in the literature by statistically testing the role of political forces in determining the price structure in the case of publicly-owned electric utilities (POEUs). The price differential between residential and commercial users is examined. Variables reflecting the relative political influence of the customer groups are discussed and their strength as determinants of the rate structure is tested. The findings are consistent with theoretical expectations; the higher the gain from favoring one group relative to the other, the greater the variance in price between groups.