Dividend Omissions and Intraindustry Information Transfers

We examine potential information transfers from companies that announce dividend omissions to their industry rivals. Specifically, we examine the abnormal stock returns and abnormal earnings forecast revisions of rivals after a company makes a dividend‐omission announcement. Our results show negative and significant abnormal stock returns and negative and significant abnormal forecast revisions for rival companies in response to the announcement, and a significant and positive relation between the two. We conclude that a dividend‐omission announcement transmits unfavorable information across the announcing company's industry that affects cash flow expectations and ultimately stock prices.     

Determining factors in entry choice for international expansion. The case of the Spanish hotel industry

The hotel sector, as a service industry where it is possible to separate capital investment from management skills, is a clear example of how internationalisation can be modelled without shareholding involvement through foreign direct investment. This paper is an empirical examination of the key factors influencing the decision process carried out by Spanish hotel companies in choosing an entry mode for international expansion. The main objective is to verify whether the concepts derived from the transaction-cost, agency and the strategic theories of organisational capability and knowledge in companies can really explain the mode of foreign expansion employed by the Spanish hotel sector. This study will allow comparison of findings on holiday resort hotel chains with other analyses on the international hotel industry.     

Service Competitiveness – An Anglo-US Study

This article reports on the latest in a series of international comparisons of management practices and performance outcomes of industries in various countries. Here, it is the service industries in the UK and the US which come under the microscope. Among the companies surveyed, there were more world-class performers in the US than the UK, but also more low performers. The concluding part of the article is diagnostic – the authors also suggest measures which could improve performance.     

The divide-and-conquer and employer/ employee models of discrimination: Neoclassical competition as a familial defect

This article is an examination of the similarities between Michael Reich’s divide-and-conquer model of discrimination and the Becker-Arrow taste model of discrimination. It shows that Reich’s model of discrimination is analytically identical to Arrow’s employer discrimination model when employer utility is a function of total profits and the racial employment ratio. It also shows that the Becker-Arrow distinction between employer and employee discrimination is invalid. Finally, the author argues that neoclassical competition is the major defect of both models. After discussing the implications of these results the article points to new directions in the literature on the economics of discrimination.     

Bivariate and multivariate scaled association models. An application to homogamy of social origin and education in Hungary between 1930 and 1979

In this article we compare bivariate and multivariate models for homogamy of social origin and education to test whether bivariate models of homogamy lead to biased results. We use data on Hungarian couples married between 1930 and 1979 and loglinear models of scaled association. The results indicate some differences between bivariate and multivariate analyses. At each point of time bivariate models overestimate homogamy, both with respect to education and social origin. However, results on trends in time do not differ much between the two analyses. The exception is the period 1940–1959, in which bivariate analysis showed decreasing educational homogamy, and multivariate analysis showed an increasing trend. The latter finding can be explained by declining homogamy of social origin, as well as the weaker reproduction and cross-effects in this period.     

A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.