Aid,Terrorism, and Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control

ABSTRACT

This paper checks the effect of foreign aid on terrorism–foreign direct investment (FDI) nexus, while considering the extent of domestic corruption control (CC). The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 78 developing countries. The following findings were established: the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in countries with higher levels of CC; foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in countries with high level of CC. Also, the result is mixed when foreign aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral components. While our findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse effect of terrorism on FDI, we find that multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of other forms of terrorism that can neither be classified as domestic or transnational. Policy implications are discussed in the paper.     

FOREIGN AID,TERRORISM AND GROWTH: CONDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM QUANTILE REGRESSION

In this study, we investigate the role of development assistance in reducing a hypothetically negative impact of terrorism on economic growth, using a panel of 78 developing nations with data for the period 1984–2008. The empirical evidence is based on interactive quantile regressions. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics are employed while development assistance measurements comprised bilateral and multilateral aid variables. With regard to the investigated hypothesis, we consistently confirm that: (i) In quantiles where terrorism is found to increase (decrease) economic growth, its interaction with foreign aid decreases (increases) economic growth. (ii) Comparing thresholds of the modifying aid variables for which the hypothesis is either rejected or accepted reveals that higher levels of multilateral (bilateral) aid are needed to reverse the negative effect of total (unclear) terrorism on growth, than the quantity needed to reverse the positive impact of transnational (domestic and total) terrorism(s) on growth. (iii) There is scant evidence of positive net effects. Overall the findings broadly indicate that foreign aid is a necessary but not a sufficient policy tool for completely dampening the effects of terrorism on economic growth.     

Fighting Terrorism: Empirics on Policy Harmonisation

This paper models the feasibility of common policy initiatives against global terrorism, as well as timelines for their enforcement. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables are used. Absolute (or unconditional) and conditional catch‐ups are estimated using Generalised Method of Moments. We establish consistently that, the rate of catch‐up is higher in domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. The time to full catch‐up required for the implementation of common policies without distinction of nationality is found to be in a horizon of 13–20 years for domestic terrorism and 24–28 years for transnational terrorism. Hence, from a projection date of 2009, in spite of decreasing cross‐country differences in terrorists’ attacks, there is still a long way to go before feasible common policy initiatives can be fully implemented without distinction of nationality. The paper is original by its contribution to the empirics of conflict resolution through decreasing cross‐country differences in terrorism tendencies. Policy implications are discussed.     

African Development: Beyond Income Convergence

In examining some big questions on African development, I provide evidence that the dynamics of some development indicators could support both endogenous and neoclassical growth theories in the convergence debate. This paper investigates convergence in real per capita gross domestic product and inequality‐adjusted human development in 38 African countries, disaggregated into 10 homogenous panels based on regions (Sub‐Saharan and North Africa), income levels (low, middle, lower middle and upper middle), legal origins (English common law and French civil law) and religious dominations (Christianity and Islam). The main finding is that the income component of the Human Development Index moves slower than others in the convergence process, and thus requires a more focused policy intervention. As a policy implication, looking beyond income convergence can provide a concrete agenda for development involving all aspects of economic, institutional and social life.     

The Role of ICT in Modulating the Effect of Education and Lifelong Learning on Income Inequality and Economic Growth in Africa

This study assesses the role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in modulating the impact of education and lifelong learning on income inequality and economic growth. It focuses on a sample of 48 African countries from 2004 to 2014. The empirical evidence is based on the generalized method of moments. The following findings are established. First, mobile phone and internet each interact with primary school education to decrease income inequality. Second, all ICT indicators interact with secondary school education to exert a negative impact on the Gini index. Third, fixed broadband distinctly interacts with primary school education and lifelong learning to have a positive effect on economic growth. Fourth, ICT indicators do not significantly influence inequality and economic growth through tertiary school education and lifelong learning. These main findings are further substantiated. Policy implications are discussed.     

The Questionable Economics of Development Assistance in Africa: Hot-Fresh Evidence, 1996–2010

This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated data (1996–2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The effects of Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed.     

Perceptions of Marketing and Approaches to Implementation

In the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the relationship between mobile phones and finance, the author examines the correlations between mobile phone penetration and financial development using two conflicting definitions of the financial system in the financial development literature. With the traditional International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2008) definition, mobile phone penetration has a negative correlation with traditional financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity, and size. However, when a previously missing informal-financial sector component is integrated into the definition, mobile phone penetration has a positive correlation with informal financial development. Three implications result: There is a growing role of informal finance; mobile phone penetration may not be positively assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators; and it is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial development indicators that will orient monetary policy.     

Dynamic openness and finance in Africa

This study assesses dynamics of openness and finance in Africa by integrating financial development dynamics of depth, activity and size in the assessment of how financial, trade, institutional, political and other openness policies (of second generation structural and institutional reforms) have affected financial development. The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Method of Moments with data from 28 African countries for the period 1996–2010. The following findings are established. (1) While the de jure (KAOPEN) indicator of financial openness improves financial depth, the de facto (FDI) measurement decreases it, with the effect of the latter measure positive on financial size. (2) Whereas trade openness improves financial depth, its effect on financial activity and size is negative. (3) Institutional openness has a positive effect on financial dynamics of depth and activity, while its effect on financial size is negative. (4) Political openness and economic freedom are detrimental to financial depth and activity. Justifications for these nexuses are discussed.     

Is Poverty in the African DNA (Gene)?

A 2015 World Bank report on attainment of Millennium Development Goals concludes that the number of extremely poor has dropped substantially in all regions with the exception of Sub‐Saharan Africa. We assess if poverty is in the African gene by revisiting the findings of Ashraf and Galor and reformulating the “Out of Africa Hypothesis” into a “Genetic Diversity Hypothesis” for a “Within Africa Analysis.” We motivate this reformulation with five shortcomings largely drawn from the 2015 findings of the African Gerome Variation Project, notably: limitations in the conception of space, an African dummy in genetic diversity, linearity in migratory patterns, migratory origins and underpinnings of genetic diversity in Africa. Ashraf and Galor have concluded that cross‐country differences in development can be explained by genetic diversity in a Kuznets or inverted U‐shaped pattern. Our results from an exclusive African perspective partially confirm the underlying hypothesis in a contemporary context, but not in the historical analysis. From a historical context, the nexus is U‐shaped for migratory distance, mobility index and predicted diversity while for the contemporary analysis; it is hump shaped for ancestry‐adjusted predicted diversity. Hence from a within‐Africa comparative standpoint, poverty is not in the African gene.