Arbeidsproduktivitet og reall?nn under den sovjetiske 7-?rsplan

Den vesentlige del av opplysningerre i denne artikkel er hentet fra en artikkel skrevet av D. Karpukhin iPlanovoe khozjaistvo nr. 1, 1960.     

Base independence in the analysis of tax policy effects: with an application to Norway 1992–2004

The analysis contrasts results of two recently expounded microlevel data approaches to derive robust intertemporal characterizations of redistributional effects of income tax schedules; the fixed-income procedure of Kasten et al. (Tax progressivity and Income Inequality, Cambridge University Press, 1994) and the transplant-and-compare method of Dardanoni and Lambert (J. Public Econ. 86:99–122, 2002). Our study is normative in that the Blackorby and Donaldson (Can. J. Econ. 17:683–694, 1984) index of tax progressivity is employed. This enables contributions from vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity also to be assessed, using for the latter one classical measure and one no reranking measure. When the competing methodologies are applied to Norwegian data for 1992–2004, their respective strengths and weaknesses are revealed. The transplant-and-compare procedure is found to have a number of advantages.      

Policy Rules for Exploitation of Renewable Resources: A Macroeconomic Perspective

A fundamental problem for an economy based on a common property resource is the absence of a market to trade the resource. This implies that private costs will be below social costs. This paper investigates possible government interventions that correct for such distortions in a neoclassical growth model with a production externality in harvesting. The model predicts that the welfare of the representative household increases considerably when a Piguovian tax is implemented. The policy that replicates the command optimum is highly complex and changes over time. On the other hand, a large share of the maximum welfare increase is internalized by introducing a constant quantity tax, suggesting that the potential of such policies is high.     

Elites and the expansion of education in nineteenth‐century Sweden

A large literature emphasizes that elite capture of political institutions hampered the spread of mass schooling in the nineteenth and twentieth century. We collect new data on investments in elementary education and the distribution of voting rights for more than 2,000 local governments in nineteenth‐century Sweden and document that educational expenditure was higher where the distribution of political power was more unequal. In particular, areas governed by local landed elites—even those where a single landowner had de jure dictatorial powers—invested substantially more in mass schooling relative to areas where political power was more widely shared, or where it lay in the hands of capitalist elites. Our findings lend quantitative support to an earlier literature produced by economic and social historians which argues that landed elites advanced mass schooling as part of their historical role as patrons of the local community and as a response to the increasing proletarianization of the rural population, while also furthering our understanding of how Sweden maintained a high level of human capital despite its low level of economic development and restricted franchise in the nineteenth century.     

Ownership and Growth

This article suggests how state enterprises can be incorporatedinto the theoretical and empirical growth literature. Specifically,it shows that if state enterprises are less efficient than privatefirms, invest less, employ less skilled labor, and are lesseager to adopt new technology, then a large state enterprisesector tends to be associated with slow economic growth, allelse remaining the same. The empirical evidence for 1978–92indicates that, through a mixture of these channels, an increasein the share of state enterprises in employment by one standarddeviation could reduce per capita growth by one to two percentagepoints a year from one country to another.     

Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime‐Dynastic Income Concepts*

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth‐tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes. In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by high‐income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.     

Fees and the Efficiency of Tradable Permit Systems: An Experimental Approach

The paper presents the results of an economic experiment in which the effects of fees on allocative efficiency of tradable utilization permits (e.g. pollution permits) are explored. Laboratory subjects (university students) play the roles of firms whose generic product requires a specific input or permits. Scarcity is exogenously introduced by a fixed supply of tradable production permits. Three treatments are compared: No fee imposed (N); a fixed tax per permit (T); and partial retraction of permits and subsequent redistribution by auction (A). Treatments T and A represent two different ways of imposing fees, which are designed to be revenue equivalent. Our results indicate that, after controlling for deviation of permit prices from a prediction based on fundamentals, fees have an impact on distribution of permits. Interestingly, a fixed tax enhances efficiency compared to the case of no fees while retraction and reallocation by auction tends to reduce efficiency. Apparently, subjects’ decision making is affected by the imposition of fees, but how and to what extent depends on the method used.     

Alternatives to Paying Child Benefit to the Rich: Means-Testing or Higher Tax?

There appears to be a general movement away from universal child benefits and towards means-testing. In the present article we argue that instead of suppressing the labour supply of middle-income parents by withdrawing the transfer as a function of income, one should consider the alternative of financing a generous universal child benefit by increasing taxation of income. The implications of means-testing compared with a tax-financed universal alternative are discussed analytically in a piecewise linear schedule and by combining information from behavioural and non-behavioural micro-simulation models. Our results provide support for making child benefit universal instead of means-tested.