The measurement and management of human performance in seventeenth century English farming: The case of Henry Best

Agriculture is one of the oldest and most important forms of organised human activity Roberts [Roberts, J. M. (1988). The Pelican History of the World. London: Penguin, p. 49] but accounting historians have paid it relatively little attention when investigating the measurement and management of human performance. Undertaking a detailed analysis of the records of Henry Best, a seventeenth century English farmer, the current paper seeks to remedy this deficit. The current research finds that Best maintained financial records but notes that, in the absence of external accountability relationships and professional accounting, these records were not used for the calculation of financial performance or financial position but were employed simply to maintain track of transactions and to hold his workforce accountable for their performance. In drawing up a treatise on operational farm management for the benefit of his son and heir, who did subsequently employ this treatise, Best made extensive use of non-financial information. Best advocated that, when managing human performance, personal supervision should be guided by appropriate measurement systems: presaging later developments in scientific management, Best developed, inter alia, labour classifications, specified rates of pay, and required working methods and output levels. Like labour tasking on nineteenth century slave plantations, Best's methods may be perceived as “thematic precursor(s) to accounting-based disciplinary controls like standard costs and a transitory element from pre-modern to modern control systems” Tyson [Tyson, T., et al. (2004). Theoretical perspectives on accounting for labor on slave plantations of the USA and British West Indies. Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal, 17(5), p. 758].     

Regional GDP in the UK, 1861–1911: new estimates

This article compares the Geary–Stark method for distributing known GDP totals across regions with a variation suggested by Crafts. Tests of the Geary–Stark method confirm that it generates accurate estimates of regional GDP. There are practical and conceptual problems with Crafts' extension, and it is not tested nor is it testable. New estimates of regional GDP for the period 1861 to 1911 contradict Crafts's suggestion of rising regional inequality. Purchasing power parity adjustments do not alter this trend. The new estimates confirm Ireland's post‐Famine catch‐up. The great bulk of Irish labour productivity growth can be accounted for by an upward shifting production function, though it can be argued that that portion of growth that represents catch‐up may be attributable to labour force decline.     

The (International) Political Economy of Falling Wage Shares: Situating Working-Class Agency

This paper relates the financial and monetary dimensions of the contemporary economic crisis to working-class agency via a central concern of classical political economy: the distribution of surplus between the chief factors of production. The fall in the wage share of value added is now accepted as a stylised fact in the empirical economic literature. This paper argues that the punctuated pattern of the development validates the regulation theoretical narrative of an epochal shift from Fordism to finance-led accumulation. Furthermore, synthesising econometric studies supports a class-centred explanation. In the last instance, the falling wage share is due to successful transnational class rule in the form of a neoliberal hegemonic paradigm. Crucially, such class rule restructured the environment of trade unions, rendering increasingly ineffective its relational power resources. The paper concludes by considering the contradictory implications for organised labour of the current financial crisis. On the one hand, the financial crisis offers an opportunity to link its particular interests to the general interest of macroeconomic management since low wage share inhibits growth rates. But how might trade unions assert a higher wage share in the face of the structural power of (financial) capital?     

PROPERTIES OF OPTION PRICES IN MODELS WITH JUMPS

We study convexity and monotonicity properties of option prices in a model with jumps using the fact that these prices satisfy certain parabolic integro–differential equations. Conditions are provided under which preservation of convexity holds, i.e., under which the value, calculated under a chosen martingale measure, of an option with a convex contract function is convex as a function of the underlying stock price. The preservation of convexity is then used to derive monotonicity properties of the option value with respect to the different parameters of the model, such as the volatility, the jump size, and the jump intensity.     

Does corruption increase emerging market bond spreads?

We study the relationship between corruption and borrowing costs for governments and firms in emerging markets. Combining data on bonds traded in the global market with survey data on corruption compiled by Transparency International, we show that countries that are perceived as more corrupt must pay a higher risk premium when issuing bonds. The global bond market ascribes a significant cost to corruption: an improvement in the corruption score from the level of Lithuania to that of the Czech Republic lowers the bond spread by about one-fifth. This is true even after controlling for macroeconomic effects that are correlated with corruption. We find little evidence that investors became more sensitive to corruption in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.     

Globalisation and union opposition to technological change

Trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adoption of labour-saving technology when labour demand is inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages. Trade liberalisation typically increases trade union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached in a model of unionised international duopoly with two-way trade. We also find that the incentive for technology opposition is stronger in the more technologically advanced country and in the country with the larger home market, complementing earlier explanations for technological catch-up and leapfrogging.     

Elective Stock Dividends and REITs: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

In response to the recent financial crisis, the U.S. Government introduced new rules which allow Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to issue elective stock dividends (ESDs), i.e., noncash dividends, to satisfy their distribution requirements. The purported goal of these rules was to provide temporary relief to REITs facing cash flow problems. We investigate how the introduction of these rules affects dividend policy of REITs. Surprisingly, we document that only 17 REITs chose to issue elective stock dividends. We examine the characteristics of these REITs and find that their cash flows are similar to REITs that do not select these dividends. This suggests that cash flow problems are unlikely to be the primary determinant of the ESD issuance decision. Instead, our findings indicate the decision to pay ESDs is related to the level of loans that are close to maturity, REIT size, growth prospects and poor performance during the financial crisis. Furthermore, we find that the same factors determine the ratio, amount and frequency of stock dividends issued by these REITs. We also examine the response of shareholders to ESDs announcements and find positive abnormal returns surrounding these dividend announcements.     

China in Global Economic Governance

China has made contradictory claims about its attitude toward the existing international order. Is China a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing international regimes? Or has China been a new type of great power seeking to reform the existing world order, making it more friendly toward the global South? In this article, we look beyond Chinese rhetoric and examine China's behavior in global economic governance. A comparison with other emerging powers and traditional major powers shows that China has been actively involved in global economic governance. But, thus far, China has not exercised substantive leadership nor has it pushed hard for change to benefit the developing countries. The level of its support of the current regimes varies across issue areas and is primarily driven by its changing economic interest.