What's it worth? A general manager's guide to valuation

Behind every major resource-allocation decision a company makes lies some calculation of what that move is worth. So it is not surprising that valuation is the financial analytical skill general managers want to learn more than any other. Managers whose formal training is more than a few years old, however, are likely to have learned approaches that are becoming obsolete. What do generalists need in an updated valuation tool kit? In the 1970s, discounted-cash-flow analysis (DCF) emerged as best practice for valuing corporate assets. And one version of DCF-using the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC)-became the standard. Over the years, WACC has been used by most companies as a one-size-fits-all valuation tool. Today the WACC standard is insufficient. Improvements in computers and new theoretical insights have given rise to tools that outperform WACC in the three basic types of valuation problems managers face. Timothy Luehrman presents an overview of the three tools, explaining how they work and when to use them. For valuing operations, the DCF methodology of adjusted present value allows managers to break a problem into pieces that make managerial sense. For valuing opportunities, option pricing captures the contingent nature of investments in areas such as R&D and marketing. And for valuing ownership claims, the tool of equity cash flows helps managers value their company's stake in a joint venture, a strategic alliance, or an investment that uses project financing.     

Organizational climate factors and the evaluation of technical ideas

Based on data obtained from 359 idea evaluators, canonical correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship between several organizational factors and a set of criteria used in the evaluation of technical ideas. In contrast to other studies, it was found that organizational factors—assessed in terms of organizational climate—could be explained in terms of two dimensions: organizational clarity and risk. Technical evaluation criteria could be explained in terms of professional self-gratification and organizational responsibility. In light of the multivariate relationship among the two sets of factors, a number of organizational design implications are outlined.     

Indonesian population growth 1971-1980

The author reviews the accuracy of the preliminary results of the 1980 Indonesian population census. Methodological weaknesses and errors made in implications for evaluating the effectiveness of family planning programs are considered     

Money creation and economic activity

Summary In the Netherlands not much attention is paid to money supply figures as an indicator of actual monetary conditions. This can be partly explained by the publication lag and the continuous revisions of seasonally adjusted data. However, the information that can be derived from money supply figures is limited because of temporary disturbances originating from the foreign exchange market. In this paper a correction method for these temporary disturbances is proposed. Money supply figures show a much closer link to real economic activity when corrected in this way.A different version of this essay with less emphasis on Holland but more information about other West-European countries has been published as chapter II Watching the money supply in: Eduard J. Bomhoff,Monetary Uncertainty, Amsterdam and New York, 1983. We gratefully acknowledge the able research assistance of Isolde B. Woittiez and Geert Rouwenhorst; Kempen and Co. kindly provided the two figures.     

The economics of dying: A misapplication of tools

Conclusions Unlike McKenzie and Tullock, we do not know how personsshould treat their bodily organs or what is an ideal exit. That depends upon their utility goals, which are defined in output terms specific to the decision maker. We contend that the body is an input into the utility production process, and therefore, as with any input, it must be maintained and repaired at a level consistent with the output goals for maximization of utility. Thus, from this framework, it is quite consistent for a person to die with healthy organs without any thought of belief in reincarnation or the desire to bequeath one's bodily organs to others, or religious values. Self interest is all that must prevail.Also, the fact that there are interrelationships between the organs in the system, and at points these relationships take on fixed factor characteristics such that reduced levels of operation in one organ can create disorientation or coma or damage to other organs, means that the body cannot die as M-T suggest. Zero capacity for all organs at death is a technical impossibility as well as being inconsistent with the output goals of utility maximizers.     

The Indonesian national family planning program

With a change in the Indonesian government in 1965 there came a change in government policy from pronatalist to limiting the birthrate. In January 1970 the government National Family Planning Cordinating Body was established. During the initial phase of the program family planning efforts have been limited to the islands of Java and Bali where family planning services are integrated into health service clinics. By the beginning of 1975 there were some 2400 clinics on Java and Bali. Family planning acceptors increased from 53,100 in 1969 to 1.5 million in 1974. The 1st phase of the program aimed at consolidating government support, winning local formal and informal leader support, introducing services into public clinic health systems, and building a viable administrative organization. The 2nd phase of the program has quantified the goal of the program, shifted from an emphasis on new acceptors to continuing users, broadened the participation of various government and nongovernmental groups, expanded the program into the private sector, and initiated a research and development program to stimulate local problem identification and resolution. By mid-1975 over 4.7 million women, or 34% of the married women between the ages of 15 and 44, had been recruited into the program. The East Java program has consistently been the most cost effective in terms of recruiting new acceptors. In terms of cost per couple year of protection, the trend has been steadily downward over the 3 years of study in the provinces of Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Bali where there are programs. The program needs to develop new approaches for those individuals who are not yet acceptors. Additionally, the program must concentrate on user continuation.     

ACTION,AGENCIES, ADVOCACY,AND ANALYSTS1

Generally speaking, human beings dislike admitting flaws in their actions. The complexities of regional development provide ample opportunity for flawed action. As public intervention in the process of economic and social development is on the upswing, serious attention must be paid to evaluations in order to minimize flaws in the programs. This paper examines three constraints to evaluation: friction generated by data collection; absence of precise goals and modus operandi coupled with continuous program modification; and role conflict within the evaluation team. The difficulties with data lie in the definition of regional boundaries and hostility of the people resulting from normlessness and government involvement. Regional survey research centers are suggested to mitigate the problem. The second conistraint exists because of the sensitivity of program administrators to critical evaluation. They react with vague, general, and illusory goals, discounting and negation of results, and the concept of a pilot study from which “lessons learned always justify a program.” Long-run conditioning and public relations may be the only effective policies to relieve this constraint. The third constraint of role conflict has always existed but is particularly important when changes in programs derive from their evaluations. The solution is for our professions to insist on full public disclosure of results coupled with triyearly turnover of evaluation personnel. De façon générale, les humains détestent avouer leurs fautes. he dévelop-peraent régional étant trés complexe, beaucoup ?actions enterprises pourront s'avérer défectueuses ou néfastes. intervention publique dans le processus de développement économique et social se faisant peu fréqtiente, une attention spéciale et constante doit être apportée aux évaluations visant. à minimiser les erreurs dans les programmes. Cet article eiamine trois contraintes propres à?évaluation: obstacles crées par la cueilette des données; absence de buts prés et de modus operandi joints à une modification continuelle du programme; et conflit de rôle dans ?équipe ?évaluation. Les difficultés avec les données sont liées à la délimitation des régions et à?hostilityé des gens résultant de ?absence compléte de normes et de ?ingérence gouvernementale dans la vie privée. Pour résoudre le probléme, on suggére des centres ?enquétes et de recherches régionaux. La seconde contrainte vient du fait que les administrateurs de programme sont sensibles à une évaluation critique. lis répondent avec des buts vagues, généraux et illusoires; Us ne nient pas les résultats mais n'acceptent pas le concept ?une étude pilote óu “Les resultats obtenus justifient toujours un plan ?amélioration.” Un conditionnement à long terme et des relations extérienres peuvent être les settles politiques efficaces pour parer à cette contrainte. La troisiéme, due au conflit de rôle, a toujours existé mais elle est particu-liérement importante quand les modifications de programme dérivent de leurs évaluations. La solution serait que les associations professionnelles insistent sur une divulgation compléte des réstultats au public ainsi qu'un renouueUement du personnel ?évaluation tous les trois ans.