Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply

I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.     

INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS IN INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS

The analysis of income distribution (ID) has traditionally been of prime importance for economists and policy-makers. However, the standard input–output (I–O) model is not particularly well equipped for studying current issues such as the consequences of decreasing access to primary inputs or the effects of specific redistributive policies. This paper addresses this gap in the existing literature. We propose that IDs can excellently be studied by restructuring the I–O relations. A new coefficients matrix is defined, the so-called augmented input coefficients matrix. This matrix is the sum of the intermediate input coefficients matrix and newly constructed matrices of sector-specific input coefficients that represent the existing distribution of income. We show that shifts in the distribution can be modelled by attributing weights to these matrices and vary these according to system-specific rules. Numerical illustrations based on the existing literature are given throughout the paper.     

The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to Environmental Change

Most research on corporate directors has focused on two roles: agency and resource dependence. While these two roles are theoretically and practically distinct, previous research has used the same classification scheme for measuring board composition regardless of role examined. Our paper examines the resource dependence role of directors and posits that the widely used insider/outsider categorizations do not adequately capture this role of directors. A taxonomy of directors is presented specifically for studying the resource dependence role. We then apply the taxonomy to a sample of US airline firms undergoing deregulation, and examine how board composition changes parallel the changing resource dependence needs of the firms. We conclude that the board's function as a link to the external environment is an important one, and that firms respond to significant changes in their external environment by altering board composition.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choose to Fight or Choose to Flee? A Network Embeddedness Perspective of Executive Ship Jumping in Declining Firms

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship‐jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network‐based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive‐level ship‐jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship‐jumping decision. Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (*ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U‐shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well‐established firm‐level alliance network discourage the ship‐jumping choice. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the duality principle in option pricing: semimartingale setting

The purpose of this paper is to describe the appropriate mathematical framework for the study of the duality principle in option pricing. We consider models where prices evolve as general exponential semimartingales and provide a complete characterization of the dual process under the dual measure. Particular cases of these models are the ones driven by Brownian motions and by Lévy processes, which have been considered in several papers. Generally speaking, the duality principle states that the calculation of the price of a call option for a model with price process S=e ^H (with respect to the measure P) is equivalent to the calculation of the price of a put option for a suitable dual model S′=e ^H′ (with respect to the dual measure P′). More sophisticated duality results are derived for a broad spectrum of exotic options. The second named author acknowledges the financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, Eb 66/9-2). This research was carried out while the third named author was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt foundation.     

Limit order books and trade informativeness

In the microstructure literature, information asymmetry is an important determinant of market liquidity. The classic setting is that uninformed dedicated liquidity suppliers charge price concessions when incoming market orders are likely to be informationally motivated. In limit order book (LOB) markets, however, this relationship is less clear, as market participants can switch roles, and freely choose to immediately demand or patiently supply liquidity by submitting either market or limit orders. We study the importance of information asymmetry in LOBs based on a recent sample of 30 German Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) stocks. We find that Hasbrouck's (1991) measure of trade informativeness Granger causes book liquidity, in particular that required to fill large market orders. Picking-off risk due to public news-induced volatility is more important for top-of-the book liquidity supply. In our multivariate analysis, we control for volatility, trading volume, trading intensity and order imbalance to isolate the effect of trade informativeness on book liquidity.     

A Corporate Social Responsibility Framework for Accounting Research

Over the past two decades, there has been growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) among accounting scholars. As a testament to this growing interest, two review papers on CSR were published last year in accounting journals. Implicitly guiding hypothesis development in CSR studies is the notion of a conflict between shareholders and stakeholders. We define CSR in terms of a win-win situation for shareholders and stakeholders: a CSR framework for strategic business purposes. We provide evidence supporting this outlook for CSR using cases pertaining to specific companies and findings from archival empirical studies. According to our CSR framework, resources allocated for CSR activity also help propel business strategy; as such, it is difficult to isolate CSR inputs and/or outputs due to problems of non-separability and multidimensionality. While measurement is a challenge, our framework nonetheless opens up various promising avenues for future research.     

Informed arbitrage with speculative noise trading

We consider speculative noise trading when some naïve speculators trade on noise as if it were information [Black, F., 1986. Noise. Journal of Finance 41, 529–543]. We examine the optimal trading strategy of an informed investor who faces such naïve speculators in the market. We find that the informed investor trades aggressively on her information and takes large, opposite positions against the naïve speculators. The trading volume is thereby drastically magnified. While such speculative noise trading enhances liquidity, it makes prices less efficient. The overall dynamic patterns that emerge from our model are most consistent with the evidence for interday variations in volume, volatility, and transaction costs.