Venture capitalist monitoring: Evidence from governance structures

We examine the impact of venture capitalist (VC) involvement, quality and exit on corporate governance structures at the time of and subsequent to an initial public offering (IPO). Venture capital backed firms utilize governance structures with greater levels of monitoring at the time of an IPO compared to non-backed firms, but this difference begins to dissipate over time. While short-lived, IPOs backed by high quality VCs have greater overall monitoring levels than those IPOs backed by low quality VCs. IPOs backed by high quality VCs use significantly more equity-based compensation than their low quality counterparts. Finally, the exit of a VC materially alters the governance structure of firms. Measures of governance decline following the departure of a venture capital firm. Overall, the presence of a venture capitalist affects governance structures of firms both at the IPO and through the early years as public firms.     

Invisible costs in offshoring services work

Offshoring service work is an accelerating trend. While the cost-savings from offshoring service work are usually clear, operating at a distance also brings with it certain “invisible costs.” We combine existing service operations theory with insights from the literature on communications and culture to present a new conceptual framework, organized around interaction intensity and interaction distance. We identify the drivers of these costs. We conclude with recommendations for controlling or attenuating invisible costs in offshoring service work.     

Stock Market Mean Reversion and the Optimal Equity Allocation of a Long-Lived Investor

This paper solves numerically the intertemporalconsumption and portfolio choiceproblem of an infinitely-lived investor whofaces a time-varying equity premium.The solutions we obtain are very similarto the approximate analytical solutionsof Campbell and Viceira (1999), except atthe upper extreme of the state spacewhere both the numerical consumption andportfolio rules flatten out.We also consider a constrained version ofthe problem in which the investor facesborrowing and short-sales restrictions.These constraints bind when the equitypremium moves away from its mean in eitherdirection, and are particularly severe forrisk-tolerant investors. The constraints havesubstantial effects on optimalconsumption, but much more modest effects onoptimal portfolio choice in theregion of the state space where they are notbinding.     

An efficiency wage approach to reconciling the wage curve and the Phillips curve

This study develops an efficiency wage model that generates a wage curve at the regional level and a Phillips curve at the national level, under the assumption that workers' efficiency depends on both regional and aggregate labor market conditions. An equation relating wages to unemployment and lagged wages is derived from the profit-maximizing behavior of firms, and it is demonstrated that the coefficient on lagged wages is less than 1 with regional data but equals 1 with aggregate data. In addition, there is an equilibrium relationship between unemployment and wages at the regional level, but not at the aggregate level.