Money disillusion and stagflation

In the conventional income-expenditure model with rigid wages, the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping. Increases in demand therefore imply increases in real output and employment. We demonstrate here that this conclusion depends on the form of money illusion implied by the rigid wage assumption. If we assume instead that labor supply is more sensitive to price increases than to wage increases, the aggregate supply curve is negatively sloped, and the conventional policy multipliers are thereby reversed. In the second section, we show that this result also follows if labor supply depends on the expected real wage.     

Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.     

The political economy of industrialisation

This paper analyses how incentives under different sets of political institutions map into policies that promote industrialisation. I set out an endogenous growth model with non-overlapping generations, where agents are heterogeneous with respect to wealth, skills and political power. The skills of the political elite play a crucial role for industrialisation to occur. It is shown that a flat wealth distribution and a skilled political elite enhance development the most in elitist regimes, while democracies perform as well as elitist regimes in terms of industrialisation. The theoretical results regarding elitist regimes are in line with evidence on the Industrial Revolution.     

Adoption of improved irrigation and drainage reduction technologies under limiting environmental conditions

Modern irrigation technologies have been suggested as a means of conserving scarce water and reducing environmental pollution caused by irrigated agriculture. This paper applies an economic model of technology selection that provides a general framework to analyzing adoption of irrigation technologies under various environmental conditions. Data from the San Joaquin Valley of California is used to verify the theoretical relationships. Results suggest key variables to be considered by policy makers concerned with adoption of modern irrigation technologies. Among these variables are crop prices, water technology costs, farm organization characteristics, and the environmental conditions of the farm or the field. Policy implications were discussed and analyzed.This research was conducted while the first author was a visiting scholar with the Dept. of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis, and USDA-ERS, USA.     

Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs

Summary An Arrovian social choice rule is a social welfare function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference. Assume a measurable outcome spaceX with its (Lebesgue) measure normalized to unity. For any Arrovian rule and any fractiont, either some individual dictates over a subset ofX of measuret or more, or at least a fraction 1–t of the pairs of distinct alternatives have their social ordering fixed independently of individual preferences. Also, for any positive integer (less than the total number of individuals), there is some subsetH of society consisting of all but persons such that the fraction of outcome pairs (x, y) that are social ranked without consulting the preferences of anyone inH, whenever no individual is indifferent betweenx andy, is at least 1–1/4.We are grateful to Roy Mathias and Daniel Waterman for help with some technical matters, and to chairman Jim Follain and the Syracuse University Economics Department for financing the exchange that launched this project. Campbell's research was funded by National Science Foundation grants, SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Book Reviews

Leon A. Mears, The New Rice Economy of Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1981, pp. xxiii + 605. Price US$15.

Alfian, Mely G. Tan, Selo Soemardjan (eds). Kemirkinan Struktural: Suatu Bunga Rampai (Structural Poverty: A Collection). Jakarta: Yayasan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (YIIS), 1980. pp. 189. Rp 2000.

Thee Kian Wie, Pemerataan- Kemiskinan- Ketimpangan (Equalization-Poverty-Uneven Distribution), Jakarta: Sinar Harapan. 1981, pp. 152. Rp 1750.

Bulletin Leknns, Year 1 No. 2, Feb. 1982, Special Edition on Employment Opportunity, Poverty and Population Mobility in Rural Areas, pp. 146.

Mubyarto (ed.), Growth and Equity in Indonesian Agricultural Development, Jakarta: Yayasan Agro Ekonomika, 1982. pp. xv + 258.

Muriel Charras, De la forêt malefique à I'herbe divine [From Malign Jungle to Divine Grain]: La transmigration en Indonesie: Les Balinais a Sulawesi, Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de I'homme 1982, pp, viii + 341. Price Fr. 90.00.

Yujiro Hayami and Masao Kikuchi. Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to Institutional Change, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981, pp. xvi + 275. Yen 4000. Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Village-level Modernization in Southeast Asia: The Political Economy of Rice and Water. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1982. pp. ix + 411. Can$34.00.

Colin MacAndrews and Chia Lin-Sien (eds.). Too Rapid Rural Development: Perceptions and Perspectives from Southeast Asia, Athens: University of Ohio Press, pp. xiv + 369. Cloth $19.95, paper $10.95.

Gary E. Hansen (ed.), Agricultural and Rural Development in Indonesia, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, pp. xiv + 312.

William L. Collier, Declining Labour Absorption (1878 to 1980) in Javanese Rice Production, Bogor: Agro-economic Survey, Rural Dynamics Study, Publication No. 2, 1980, pp. 120.     

Disclosure of Private Information and Reduction of Uncertainty: Environmental Liabilities in the Chemical Industry

We investigate the potential uncertainty-reducing role of accounting information in the context of contingent Superfund liability valuation. We first develop theoretical arguments for the way reduction of uncertainty regarding these contingent liabilities is expected to affect security prices. Empirical proxies are developed for two types of uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities: site uncertainty and allocation uncertainty. In a valuation framework, we then investigate whether financial statement disclosures and accruals reduce uncertainty and thereby affect security valuation. Specifically, we analyze the interaction of private information contained in firm disclosures and accruals with inherent uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities. Results suggest that in a regulatory environment allowing substantial reporting discretion, firm-provided financial statement information affects valuation of contingent Superfund liabilities by reducing uncertainty. Further, we find that information revealed through accruals versus disclosures is differentially effective at reducing site and allocation uncertainty.