Grid analysis for sales supervision

Falling to recognize the unique need and desire of salespeople, the sales manager tends to allocate supervisory time according to the amount of his or her past selling experience. This time allocation results in either the excessive or insufficient supervision of sales personnel. This article describes a process of arriving at a more optimum allocation of supervisory time.     

Prospective Changes in Tax Law and the Value of Depreciable Real Estate

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 significantly reduced the taxation of income-producing properties by accelerating tax depreciation on both new and, especially, existing properties. A partial reversal of the 1981 legislation appears likely. To provide some insight into the possible effects of a decrease in tax depreciation of income-producing properties, two potential tax changes are analyzed: an increase from fifteen to twenty years in the tax service lives of both new and existing properties and an increase for existing properties only. Both residential and commercial/industrial properties are considered.     

On Option-Pricing Models in Real Estate: A Critique

This paper considers the problems peculiar to options on real estate, because of the special set of institutional factors influencing real estate markets. It is intended to serve as a reply to Johnson and Wofford [15] as well as provide an overall critique of option-pricing models in a real estate context. Our major point is that a variety of real estate decisions, such as the abandonment decision, the option to refinance, or the option to exercise a contingent real estate purchase contract, may be modeled using option-pricing techniques. However, both the theoretical and institutional aspects of real estate markets must be taken into account in both developing and applying option models in a real estate context.     

Identifying and appraising how managers install strategy

Cases were profiled to identify tactics used by strategic managers to implement strategy and to determine which tactic was the most effective in promoting adoption. Analysis revealed that four archetype tactics were used almost exclusively. An ‘interventionist’ approach had the best results but was used in only one case in five. ‘Persuasion’ and ‘participation’ were next most effective tactics, and ‘edicts’ the least effective. The implications of these findings for strategic management practice and the needs for further research are discussed.     

The structure of telephone tariffs

This paper compares the structure of telephone tariffs adopted by three types of organisation: government-owned systems responsible for both posts and telephones, government-owned systems responsible for telephones alone, and privately-owned telephone systems. It is found that privately-owned systems are significantly more likely to adopt three or more peak-load pricing periods. They are also more likely to differentiate tariffs by category of subscriber, and to offer lower rates for shared lines, but these differences are only significant if private telephone systems are compared with government systems responsible for both posts and telephones. Postal responsibility alone has little or no effect on these aspects of tariffs. The paper thus provides limited support for the view that ownership systematically affects behaviour.     

Catching hipos: screening, wages, and competing for a job

In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract highability workers (hipos) in situations where people compete fora job. I show that the more people compete, the larger a firm'sincentives to sort high and low ability workers. Moreover, workerswill signal their (high) ability in situations with many competitorsonly if a job offers a high enough wage. The main result, therefore,is that a firm sets higher wages, when more people compete.     

Comment: Policy First,Research Afterward— The History of RESPA

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics -     

An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games

We conduct an experimental analysis of the bargaining between a buyer and a seller of the exchange of a single good by means of an intermediary or broker. We examine how an intermediary affects the price, the likelihood of a successful negotiation, and the time it takes to complete a negotiation. We first examine the impact of the intermediary as a pure middleman, and then as an information source about the distribution of seller and buyer reservation prices. The results show that an intermediary, whether or not informed, increases the sale price, reduces the likelihood of an agreement, and increases the time to reach an agreement (though the number of bargaining rounds declines). The results suggest that the benefits of brokerage may be predominantly in the matching of buyers and sellers rather than in facilitating bargaining.