Aggregate Fluctuations and International Migration

In this paper, we study the role of short‐run factors such as business cycles or changes in employment rates in explaining international migration flows. First, we derive a model of optimal migration choice predicting that short‐run economic fluctuations trigger migration flows on top of the impact exerted by long‐run factors. Second, we empirically test the magnitude of the effect of these short‐run factors on migration flows. Our results indicate that both aggregate fluctuations and employment rates affect migration flows. Third, we provide evidence that the Schengen Agreement and the euro significantly increased the international mobility of workers between the member countries.uuuü     

Do Urban Tax Rates Converge?

A bstract . Using a multiple regression model that seeks to explain why tax rates vary, the hypothesis is tested that similarly sized cities with similar economic functions would tend to have property tax rates that converged. What variations there are in an array of urban tax rates of 20 cities in the 100,000 to 200,000 class seem to be explained by density of settlement and by the extent to which non-property tax sources bulk importantly in total urban revenues. The inference is drawn that convergence is in fact observable. Convergence would, of course, imply tax competition as among these cities.     

Impact Fees and the Price of New Housing: An Empirical Study

Development exactions in the form of impact fees are being used increasingly by local governments to fund the cost of providing public services necessitated by growth and development. This paper presents the results of an empirical study designed to ascertain the extent to which impact fees are capitalized into the price of new, single-family dwellings. On June 3, 1974, the city of Dunedin, located in Pinellas County, Florida, began assessing impact fees of $1,150 against all new, single-family construction. Using data on 5,839 new home sales in Dunedin and three other cities in Pinellas County from 1971–1982, it was found that builders were able to pass forward the total cost of impact fees to new home buyers. However, the price differential due to impact fees for new dwellings in Dunedin compared to the price of new dwellings in the other three cities disappeared after approximately six years. This is explained by the nature of the fee structure in Dunedin, adjustments in factor costs, increases in the price of housing in competing cities, and unrealized expectations regarding the benefits to be provided by impact fee collections.     

Trade,Transboundary Pollution,and Foreign Lobbying

In this paper, we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution. We show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream (polluted) country. But if the upstream (polluting) country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs, distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country’s social welfare, and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country. Thus, the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments’ susceptibility to foreign political influence.     

The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game

This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave according to the predictions of game theory in two-person “guessing game” (beauty contest game) experiments. In this game, two individuals simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero. Because of the simplicity of the game, the widespread failure of subjects to choose the weakly dominant strategy has been interpreted as evidence of some fundamental inability to behave strategically. By contrast, we find that subjects’ behavior reflects a lack of understanding of the game form, which we define as the relationships between possible choices, outcomes and payoffs. To a surprising degree, subjects seem to have little understanding of the experimental environment in which they are participating. If subjects do not understand the game form, the experimental control needed for testing game theory is lost. The experiments reported here demonstrate that the failure to act strategically is related to how the game is presented. We test how well subjects are able to recognize the game under a variety of different presentations of the game. Some subjects fail to recognize the game form when it is presented abstractly. When the game is transformed into a simple isomorphic game and presented in a familiar context, subjects do choose weakly dominant strategies. While our results confirm the ability of subjects to make strategic decisions, they also emphasize the need to understand the limitations of experimental subjects’ ability to grasp the game as the experimenter intends. Given these limitations, we provide suggestions for better experimental control.     

A study of zero-out auctions: testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property

Summary This paper applies an experimental testbed methodology to the evaluation of a proposed mechanism for allocating the right to land at the New York airports. The mechanism is called a zero-out auction because it is supposed to allocate the rights efficiently like an auction while leaving all of the consumer's surplus with the buyers (as opposed to allocating some to the seller as would be the case with an ordinary auction). A new behavioral hypothesis is introduced to account for limited rationality of individuals and unusual behaviors of the process. The axiom, called theunbiased expectations hypothesis, does a good job of modeling individual behavior in the context of a game model.We acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Comments by David Grether, John Ledyard, Michael Levine, Jennifer Reinganum, and Richard Sutch have been very helpful.     

Technological diffusion: European experience to 1850

This paper considers the diffusion of British technology to the Continent, especially France and Prussia, during the industrial revolution. Particular attention is paid to the various transmission mechanisms and to differences in the speed of diffusion. It is shown that the economic growth of a country and its absorption of foreign technology tends to follow a logistic curve. This suggests that linear and purely economic explanations of technological transmission may be inadequate.     

Learning to collaborate through collaboration: How allying with expert firms influences collaborative innovation within novice firms

Research summary : Strategic alliances have been recognized as a means for firms to learn their partners' proprietary knowledge; such alliances are also valuable opportunities for partner firms to learn tacit organizational routines from their counterparts. We consider how relatively novice technology firms can learn intraorganizational collaborative routines from more experienced alliance partners and then deploy them independently for their own innovative pursuits. We examine the alliance relationships between Eli Lilly & Co. (Lilly), a recognized expert in collaborative innovation, and 55 small biotech partner firms. Using three levels of analysis (firm, patent, and inventor dyad), we find that greater social interaction between the partner firm and Lilly subsequently increases internal collaboration among the partner firm's inventors. Managerial summary : Can collaborating externally advance internal collaboration? Yes. Our research found that collaboration among scientists at small, early‐stage biotechnology firms significantly increased after these firms formed highly interactive R&D alliances with a large pharmaceutical company known for its expertise in such collaboration. It is well known that alliances help new firms learn specific new technologies and commercialize innovations. Our study broadens the scope of potential benefits of alliances. New firms can also learn collaboration techniques, deploying them internally to enhance their own abilities in collaborative innovation. Managers should take this additional benefit into consideration in developing their alliance strategies. Pursuing alliance partners with expertise in collaboration and keeping a high level of mutual interactions with partner firm personnel should be important considerations to extract this value. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The zero-information-limit condition and spurious inference in weakly identified models

In many econometric models the asymptotic variance of a parameter estimate depends on the value of another structural parameter in such a way that the data contain little information about the former when the latter is close to a critical value. This paper introduces the zero-information-limit-condition (ZILC) to identify such models where ‘weak identification’ leads to spurious inference. We find that standard errors tend to be underestimated in these cases, but the size of the asymptotic t-test may either be too great (the intuitive case emphasized in the ‘weak instrument’ literature) or too small as in two cases illustrated here.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.