Global added value of flexible benefits

Flexible benefits, or "flex," is a strategic human resources solution that can give companies a truly competitive edge in winning the global war for talent and containing costs. Several companies in Asia plan to implement flex in the next few years, and a number of emerging best practices in flexible benefits design are being developed. This article discusses the many advantages of flex, flex best practices emerging across Asia, and important considerations for employers when designing flexible benefits. Finally, the author shows how one global company in Singapore found flex to be an effective differentiator for attracting and retaining talent as well as helping manage employee health care costs.     

Resource rivalry and endogenous lobby

We present a two-sector model to depict the determination of trade preference. The model highlights lobby as a rivalry between sectors in competition for resources where the outcome of the lobby race is determined by each sector’s ability to generate rent at a given welfare cost to the general population. We investigate the relation between the structure of trade protection and the resource endowment.     

从长期萧条中走出的日本经济

相对而言,日本的经济很长时间以来都乏善可陈.日本终于处在十五年萧条的尾声,日本还没有完全走出低谷,在最近一两年,我们看到了曙光.现在日本经济有什么样的问题呢?它对中国的影响如何?或对其他国家的影响是什么?     

Identification of the Lorenz curve by Lorenz coefficient

Zusammenfassung Die Identifikation der Lorenzkurve durch Lorenzkoeffizienten. — Der aus der Lorenzkurve abgeleitete Gini-Koeffizient vermittelt einen guten Eindruck von dem Ma\ an Ungleichheit. W?hrend sich jedoch eine Lorenzkurve auf den Gini-Koeffizienten im Verh?ltnis eins zu eins übertragen l?\t, entspricht — in der entgegengesetzten Richtung — ein Gini-Koeffizient mehreren Lorenzkurven. In dieser Untersuchung wird die Lorenzkurve in einzelne Abschnitte aufgeteilt. Dann wird jedem Abschnitt ein gewogener Lorenz-Koeffizient zugeordnet, wodurch es m?glich wird, Lorenzkurven mit identischen Gini-Koeffizienten zu unterscheiden. Die Verbindung zwischen jedem Kurvenpaar kann aufgehoben werden, indem man von Abschnitt zu Abschnitt die jeweiligen Lorenz-Koeffizienten vergleicht. Ein empirisches Beispiel ist in dem Artikel enthalten.

---

Résumé L’identification de la courbe de Lorenz par le coefficient de Lorenz. — Le coefficient de Gini dérivé de la courbe de Lorenz exprime un degré considérable de sens intuitif pour la mesure de l’inégalité. La reproduction de la courbe de Lorenz en coefficient de Gini est cependant dans le rapport un à un, celle du coefficient de Gini en courbe de Lorenz un à beaucoup. Cette étude veut partager la courbe de Lorenz en piéces détachées. Un sous-coefficient pondéré de Lorenz est associé avec chaque partie, une méthode qui permet à différencier les courbes de Lorenz avec des coefficients identiques de Gini. Le lien entre chaque paire de courbes peut être détaché si on part d’une comparaison de chaque sous-coefficient de Lorenz de partie à partie. L’auteur fournit une application empirique.

---

Resumen Identificación de la curva de Lorenz por medio del coeficiente de Lorenz. — El coeficiente de Gini derivado de la curva de Lorenz transmite sentimientos intuitivos considerables para la medida de desigualdad. Sin embargo, el desdibujamiento de la curva de Lorenz hacia el coeficiente de Gini es uno a uno y el del coeficiente de Gini hacia la curva de Lorenz de uno a muchas veces. En este estudio se divide la curva de Lorenz en partes. Un sub-coeficiente de Lorenz se asocia con cada parte permitiéndonos diferenciar curvas de Lorenz con idénticos coeficientes de Gini. La unión entre cualquier par se puede quebrar procediendo a comparar cada sub-coeficiente de Lorenz de parte en parte. Se presenta una aplicación empírica.

     

Managerial Overconfidence,Self-Attribution Bias,and Downwardly Sticky Investment: Evidence from Korea

The extant literature on behavioral corporate finance has explored the effects of overconfidence on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICS) to explain overinvestment, yet it has overlooked the asymmetric behavior of investments in relation to changes in cash flow levels. This study examines whether investments behave asymmetrically responding to changes in cash flows and, if so, how managerial overconfidence affects asymmetric ICS. Using a sample of KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms in Korea, we find the incidence of downwardly sticky ICS in unconstrained firms. We then find that overconfident managers encourage ICS to be stickier than their rational peers do in unconstrained firms. Finally, we find that managerial overconfidence intensified by self-attribution bias induces ICS to get even stickier, suggesting more explicit evidence of corporate investment distortions. The results of alternative tests using the asymmetric models of Homburg and Nasev (2008) are qualitatively consistent with prior results. Overall, our findings imply a higher incidence of excessive investment commitments driven by overconfident managers.     

Auditor Quality,IFRS Adoption,and Stock Price Crash Risk: Korean Evidence

This paper investigates the relationship among auditor quality, International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) adoption and stock price crash risk. Using 657 unique listed companies spanning 2002–2014 in Korea, this study finds that stock price crash risk decreases, especially for firms using Big 4 auditors, after IFRS adoption in Korea. Stock price crash risk decreases for a firm included in Big 4 auditors, while it does not increase for a firm excluded from Big 4 auditors after IFRS adoption. Finally, this study finds that Big 4 auditor decreases stock price crash risk only when the firm size is above-median.     

Earnings Attribution and Information Transfers

Managers frequently attribute the news in their earnings forecasts to various economic events. Using textual analysis, we identify the economic factors underlying earnings news from press releases. We document a wide range of industry‐wide shocks and firm‐specific actions to which the earnings news in management forecasts is attributed. As expected, earnings attributions significantly affect peer firms’ price reactions to the earnings news. Specifically, earnings news attributed to industry‐wide trends or firm structural changes leads to positive information transfers but earnings news attributed to firm competitive moves triggers negative information transfers. Information transfers are much stronger when each economic factor is mentioned the first time in a given industry‐year. Further analysis reveals that the strength of information transfers varies with firm‐level rivalry within the industry (i.e., similar business strategies, market position, and level of competition).