Changes in analysts’ stock recommendations following regulatory action against their brokerage

Review of Accounting Studies - Despite the importance of sell-side analysts in the capital markets, we know little about the effectiveness of routine monitoring of the sell-side industry. We...     

Varying Coefficient Regression Models: A Review and New Developments

Varying coefficient regression models are known to be very useful tools for analysing the relation between a response and a group of covariates. Their structure and interpretability are similar to those for the traditional linear regression model, but they are more flexible because of the infinite dimensionality of the corresponding parameter spaces. The aims of this paper are to give an overview on the existing methodological and theoretical developments for varying coefficient models and to discuss their extensions with some new developments. The new developments enable us to use different amount of smoothing for estimating different component functions in the models. They are for a flexible form of varying coefficient models that requires smoothing across different covariates' spaces and are based on the smooth backfitting technique that is admitted as a powerful technique for fitting structural regression models and is also known to free us from the curse of dimensionality.     

The State as Both Regulator and Player: The Politics of Transfer of Development Rights in China

The conventional argument that the introduction of transfer of development rights (TDR) shifts the power of land use regulation from the state to the market is increasingly under challenge. In China, the state's grip on land is reinforced through TDR, in which the state is both regulator and player. This state-dominated form of TDR affects China in three ways. First, competing aspirations of different scales of government complicate how TDR is implemented. Although the central state promotes TDR to maintain a national balance of arable land, some local states instrumentalize it to expand their landed basis of accumulation. Secondly, TDR tends to benefit the state but not its people. It may increase the fiscal income of the sending government and lessen the land shortage of the receiving government, but sometimes at the expense of the interests of land users without land ownership. Thirdly, given the state's deep involvement in TDR programs, the key for China's TDR to protect arable land lies not so much in clear property rights or a fully fledged market as in effective checks and balances regarding the state's powers over TDR. These three observations attest to the embeddedness of TDR in the local political economy.     

Does reputation of sponsors matter in IPO? Evidence from Hong Kong

Contrary to other markets where underwriters perform a combined role of underwriting and sponsoring in an Initial Public Offering (IPO), IPO issuers in Hong Kong must appoint at least one sponsor in addition to the underwriters. The splitting of the single role of underwriters into two separate ones offers an ideal setting to disentangle the effects of the two roles and to examine which of the two roles—sponsor or underwriter—is more important in explaining IPO underpricing and initial volatility in the Hong Kong equity market. Interestingly, our findings provide supportive evidence that the sponsor reputation does matter in an IPO and it is even more significant than the underwriter reputation in explaining the IPO underpricing phenomenon. Given the recent high-tech fervor, our research goes deeper to examine specifically the role of sponsors on high-tech firms, with results indicating that the reliance on sponsors is higher for traditional issuers than for technology firms. We further discover that sponsors and underwriters are playing substitution roles rather than complementary roles. In order to examine the regulatory policy impact, our research also compares the role of IPO sponsors before and after the launch of the new sponsor regulatory regime in 2013. The empirical findings lend support to our argument that after the launch of the new regulations, public awareness of sponsors is raised, respect towards more reputable sponsor increases, and thus, the role of sponsors becomes more important than before.     

Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.     

South Korea’s outward direct investment and its dyadic determinants: Foreign aid,bilateral treaty and economic diplomacy

This study investigates the factors that affect South Korean outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. Most previous studies focus on monadic factors and do not consider how and to what extent bilateral relationships between South Korea and the host countries affect the investment decisions of Korean firms. The current study finds that interstate factors such as South Korea's international investment treaties with and official development assistance to host countries have positive effects on FDI to these countries, while presidential visits have strong and statistically significant effects on FDI only in countries located in non-Asian regions, especially the African continent. The findings suggest that the effects of bilateral relations on South Korea's FDI vary depending on the geographic location of the host country.     

An empirical study of voluntary transfer pricing disclosures in China

This paper empirically investigates the factors that affect the management’s voluntary disclosures of the transfer pricing details of related-party transactions. Using Chinese data from 2004 and 2005, we hypothesize and find that firms that make voluntary disclosures of the pricing methods of related-party transactions are negatively associated with (i) a higher level of earnings management (as captured by abnormal related-party transactions) and (ii) its underlying incentives (as captured by the management’s performance-linked bonuses and the firm’s incentives to achieve earnings targets); further, they are positively associated with (i) a higher percentage of independent directors and (ii) a higher percentage of government ownership. Overall, our findings suggest that earnings management and its incentives, board composition, and ownership structure significantly influence the voluntary disclosure decisions of managers.     

Industry Shock Expectations,Interindustry Linkages,and Merger Waves: Evidence from the Hospital Industry

It is well known that mergers often occur in waves, and this paper develops a new mechanism for merger waves: expectations over industry shocks. We develop a simple test of this explanation and use it to explore the role of expectations in the context of the 1990s hospital merger wave. Managed care such as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) started to become popular in the late 1980s and ultimately became an important player in the health insurance market. Our empirical analysis shows that the expected increase in the popularity of HMOs was partly responsible for the hospital merger wave of the 1990s: hospitals feared that the “innovation” of managed care in the downstream insurance market would penetrate the upstream hospital market and responded to this belief by merging. Our results show the importance of incorporating expectations and interindustry linkages into the understanding of merger waves.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.     

The cost-effectiveness of alectinib in anaplastic lymphoma kinase-positive (ALK+) advanced NSCLC previously treated with crizotinib

Introduction Anaplastic lymphoma kinase (ALK) targeting drugs provide an important option for advanced non-small cell lung cancer patients with this distinct tumor type; however, there is considerable uncertainty as to which drug provides the optimal value after crizotinib treatment. This study estimated the cost-utility of alectinib vs ceritinib from a US payer perspective.

Methods A cost-utility model was developed using partition survival methods and three health states: progression-free (PF), post-progression (PP), and death. Survival data were derived from the key clinical trials (alectinib: NP28761 &; NP28673, ceritinib: ASCEND I and II). Costs included drugs, adverse events, and supportive care. Utilities were based on trial data and the literature. One-way and probabilistic sensitivity analyses (PSA) were performed to assess parameter uncertainty.

Results Treatment with alectinib vs ceritinib resulted in increases of 2.55 months in the PF state, 0.44 quality adjusted life-years (QALYs), and $13,868, yielding a mean cost/QALY of $31,180. In the PSA, alectinib had a 96% probability of being cost-effective at a willingness-to-pay of $100,000/QALY. Drivers of model results were drug costs and utilities in the PF health state. The ICER ranged from $10,600–$65,000 per QALY in scenario analyses, including a sub-group analysis limited to patients with prior chemotherapy and crizotinib treatment.

Conclusions Treatment with alectinib in ALK?+?crizotinib-treated patients increased time progression-free and QALYs vs ceritinib. The marginal cost increase was driven by longer treatment durations with alectinib. This model demonstrates that alectinib may be considered a cost-effective treatment after progression on crizotinib.