Regulatory Constraints on Performance-Based Managerial Compensation,Bank Monitoring,and Aggregate Loan Quality

This paper evaluates the effects of binding regulatory restraints on the rate of performance-based management compensation within a banking framework in which a primary function of bank management teams is to monitor loans in order to eliminate deadweight default losses. Available management teams are endowed with heterogeneous levels of monitoring efficiencies, and obtaining services from more efficient monitoring teams requires payment of higher rates of performance-based compensation. In equilibrium, a fraction of banks choose to employ management teams that monitor. With or without binding capital requirements, imposing binding restraints on the allowed rate of performance-based compensation results either in lower bank efficiency or in a reduced fraction of monitoring banks and, hence, lower aggregate loan quality.     

Market In efficiency in Person‐to‐Person Betting: Examining ‘Known Loser’ Insider Trading on the Exchanges

Applying the Shin z measure of market efficiency to the relatively new person‐to‐person internet betting exchanges, Smith, Paton, and Vaughan Williams found “significantly lower market biases” compared to bookmaker‐dominated markets. A reduced favorite‐longshot bias is interpreted as evidence that insider trading on the exchanges “is not widespread” and “not as commonplace … as is sometimes portrayed in the media.” Given that the Shin measure assumes “betting with bookies,” whereas the exchanges represent “betting without bookies,” the present study employs the notion of ‘significant mover’ to empirically test for the presence of ‘known loser’ insider trading on the exchanges where traditional notions of bookmaking do not apply. Findings indicate that, far from being less problematized by insider trading compared to racetrack betting, activity aimed at profiting from “known losers” may be potentially commonplace on the exchanges. This includes profiting from horses that are unplaced. This study offers new insight into the efficiency of betting markets.     

The Effect of Health and Poverty on Early Childhood Cognitive Development

Although evidence of a link between socioeconomic status and child health has been researched extensively, much less attention has been devoted to studying the link between child health and cognitive development. This paper seeks to determine whether early childhood illnesses and poverty significantly impede cognitive development. The empirical model attempts to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity through the use of panel data models. Results indicate that a child’s cognitive development is not directly related to health problems acquired after birth or socioeconomic standing. Rather, cognitive development is primarily influenced by unobserved child- and family-specific factors that happen to be correlated with health and socioeconomic status. On the other hand, birth weight appears to affect cognitive performance later in childhood, even after taking unobserved heterogeneity into account.     

Right-sided endocarditis

Right-sided endocarditis is uncommon and usually involves the tricuspid valve. It occurs primarily in intravenous drug uses, and patients having pacemakers, central lines, or congenital heart disease.     

A conceptual development of Simons’ Levers of Control framework

The management control literature has been criticised for having concepts that are ill-defined. This causes mixed empirical results and makes it difficult to build a coherent body of knowledge. The paper addresses this issue by developing an important framework, that of Simons’ Levers of Control, which has been criticised in the past for its vague and ambiguous definitions. Using methods of concept analysis, the paper analyses prior literature to identify ambiguities with the different levers of control and uses examples from prior field studies to illustrate these ambiguities. The paper also analyses the positive and negative dimensions of controls, which, although part of Simons’ framework, have remained unexplored. For each ambiguity identified, the paper proposes a solution to improve concept definitions or to clarify the relationship between concepts. The result is a revised framework that explicitly separates managerial intentions for controls and employee perceptions of controls. Managerial intentions are comprised of three levels: 1) types of controls (social and technical) 2) which are organised as four control systems (strategic performance, operational performance, strategic boundaries and operational boundaries) and 3) which can be used diagnostically or interactively, have an enabling or constraining role and can lead to either reward or punishment. Finally, after defining the framework's concepts and explaining how they interact, the paper concludes by offering avenues for future research.     

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.