The impact of skewness in the hedging decision

The impact of skewness in the hedger's objective function is tested using a model of hedging derived from a third‐order Taylor Series approximation of expected utility. To determine the effect of price skewness upon hedging and speculation, analytical results are derived using an example of cotton storage. Findings suggest that when forward risk premiums and price skewness in the spot asset have opposite signs, speculation increases relative to the mean‐variance model. When the signs are identical, speculation will decrease, contradicting findings of mean‐variance models. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:503–520, 2006     

Learning about Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs

We examine the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent companies. Their investment after the spin-off is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g., industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spin-off. Spin-offs tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed primarily in spin-offs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' industries and in spin-offs where the stock market reacts favorably to the spin-off announcement. Our findings suggest that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital.     

A Spatial Cross–Sectional Analysis of Elasticity of Demand for Soccer

Several studies estimate the demand for watching English professional football (soccer) as highly inelastic, a puzzling result given that clubs appear to possess a degree of monopoly power. We discuss weaknesses in earlier studies and offer an alternative method of assessing elasticity based on travel costs of spectators living different distances from the grounds. We find that elasticity varies across the 20 senior clubs for which data were available but in almost every case demand is more elastic than reported in the existing literature and pricing policy appears therefore to be more orientated towards profit maximisation than previously thought.     

Focusing the fuzzy front–end in new product development

Effectively managing the 'upfront or fuzzy front–end' (FFE) of the product development process is one of the most important, difficult challenges facing innovation managers. In this paper, we define the FFE as the period between when an opportunity is first considered and when an idea is judged ready for development. We classify the outcomes of the FFE into product definition, time, and people dimensions. We suggest several strategies to manage the FFE by assigning a FFE manager or team; by providing organizational support for FFE activities; by understanding the sources of FFE ambiguity; by building an information system; and by developing relationships with supporters, partners, and alliances.     

Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.