What Is Fair? Experimental Evidence

There has been growing interest within the economics discipline in the role of equity concerns in the distribution of resources. This paper presents empirical evidence from controlled laboratory experiments where third-party decision makers allocate resources between two individuals. The experimental results indicate that subjects view a wide range of different allocations as the fair distribution of resources. However, regression analysis indicates that both treatment effects and a few demographic variables explain some of this variation in fairness concepts. Most significantly, decision makers rewarded subjects who earned their favorable positions, and the gender of the decision maker was an important predictor of the allocation chosen.     

Nonlinear dynamics and competing behavioral interpretations: Evidence from intra‐day FTSE‐100 index and futures data

Extant empirical research has reported nonlinear behavior within arbitrage relationships. In this article, the authors consider potential nonlinear dynamics within FTSE‐100 index and index‐futures. Such nonlinearity can be rationalized by the existence of transactions costs or through the interaction between informed and noise traders. They consider several empirical models designed to capture these alternative dynamics. Their empirical results provide evidence of a stationary basis term, and thus cointegration between index and index‐futures, and the presence of nonlinear dynamics within that relationship. The results further suggest that noise traders typically engage in momentum trading and are more prone to this behavior type when the underlying market is rising. Fundamental, or arbitrage, traders are characterized by heterogeneity, such that there is slow movement between regimes of behavior. In particular, fundamental traders act more quickly in response to small deviations from equilibrium, but are reluctant to act quickly in response to larger mispricings that are exposed to greater noise trader price risk. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:343–368, 2006     

Some Evidence on the Adjustment of Producer Prices*

We document producer price adjustment using a low‐inflation micro price dataset. On average 24% of prices adjust each month, with an average increase/decrease of 6%. Producer prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices, but their size of adjustment is typically smaller. Sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment is strongly related to heterogeneity in the cost structure. Fluctuations in aggregate producer price inflation occur to a large extent through variation in the relative share of upward and downward price adjustment.     

成本全面上涨推动珠三角经济转型

外资企业离开世界工厂 据报道，2007年有224家外资企业离开了珠三角，另有29840家港资企业（占大约80000家港资企业的37．3％）也有同样的计划。另一方面，自2007年初至今，已有103家韩资企业离开了北方制造业中心山东。     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

印尼航空业起伏录

印尼政府很早就对航空业取消了管制，最初，这的确促进了航空业的繁荣，航空业发展前景喜人，印尼开放的天空中出现了众多大型外国投资商人的身影。根据印席尼西亚航空局的统计，印尼共有19家国内航空公司，向约3400万乘客提供服务。该机构预计，到2010年，每年将有5400万旅客选择飞机出行，而在1999年，这个数字仅为640万。     

Strategic participation and the median voter result

In a seminal paper on electoral equilibrium under majority rule, Ledyard (1984) demonstrates that strategic participation by voters results in an electoral equilibrium at the proposal that maximizes the utility of a randomly selected voter. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) limit the usefulness of this result by showing that strategic participation rates are miniscule in large electorates, and that the incentive to participate vanishes completely as the electorate grows without bound. The most reasonable modification of Ledyard’s approach that circumvents these criticisms is to allow for a negative cost of voting. We show that when voters can have even an arbitrarily small negative cost of voting, there is an electorate sufficiently large so that any proposal is defeated or tied by the median proposal. This observation raises questions about the existence of electoral equilibrium under strategic participation, and is relevant to the efficiency of elections.