The xistence of definitional economics--Stigler's and Leibenstein's war of the words

The inability to agree on definitions ultimately can condemneconomic analysis and debate to fruitless argumentation. Thesharp interchange between Stigler and Leibenstein did littleto clarify the issues surrounding the controversial theory ofX-efficiency. Given their conflicting agendas, discussion betweenthese two opponents consisted largely of talking at cross purposes.This paper examines the motivations of the two protagonistsas well as considering the impact such tactics have on economicdebate and discussion.     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Measuring market response to regulation of the cable TV industry

During the 1988–1990 period, the cable television industry was subject to a number of regulatory events. These centered on possible reregulation of rates for basic service and reduction of entry barriers for potential competitors. Using the event study methodology on a portfolio of cable firms, we find evidence that news of no reregulation caused significant positive abnormal returns. News of reregulation caused insignificant negative abnormal returns. These findings provide some support for the traditional consumer protection theory of regulation. News related to entry barriers generally had no significant effect on returns, which suggests that elements of natural monopoly may exist in the industry.     

A real options perspective on entrepreneurial entry in the face of uncertainty

In this paper we develop and test theory regarding whether entrepreneurs contemplating starting a new venture account for the value of the option to defer the entry decision. While others have illuminated the theoretical applicability of real options theory to entrepreneurship, empirical evidence in this context is lacking. Consistent with predictions derived from real options theory, we find that high uncertainty in the target industry dissuades entry, and that the irreversibility of the entry decision moderates this relationship. Furthermore, we find that the irreversibility of the investment decision can be influenced by industry‐level, firm‐level and even individual‐level factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Restructuring materiel management functions: a method for prioritizing changes and reducing costs

The success of any manager depends highly on the ability to seize on opportunities that will achieve the organization's goals. Hospitals are currently searching for ways to reduce costs while maintaining or enhancing the quality of services. Quality services are increasingly being defined as those that are most responsive to customer needs. It is important, as hospital management restructures materiel systems or methods of operation for reduced costs, to focus on the user departments as the customers. The consolidation of materiel management activity should not be seen as a loss of control at the user department level. Instead it can be seen as a new way of providing service with higher quality. User departments should see concrete benefits on a weekly basis, including reduced time spent on materiel management functions; increased planning of purchasing, inventory, and distribution functions; and assistance in meeting restricted supply budgets.     

Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection

Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.Notation ={ ₁,..., _k } set of outcomes - : ₊ generic contract or lottery - A = () ; - A_o A{, where denotes the null contract or no trade - S={1,...,¦S¦} set of seller types - L(s) number of type-s sellers - M number of buyers - u: × S seller's utility function, which can be extended toA× S by puttingu(, s) ; - v. × S buyer's utility function, which can be extended toA × S by puttingv(, s) ; - f:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of sellers - g:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of buyers - A ₊ sellers' trading function - :A ×S ₊ buyers' trading function This paper has had a long gestation period, during which I have been influenced by helpful conversations with many persons, by their work, or both. Among those who deserve special mention are Martin Hellwig, Roger Myerson, Edward Prescott, Robert Townsend and Yves Younés. Earlier versions were presented to the NBER/CEME Conference on Decentralization at the University of Toronto and the NBER Conference on General Equilibrium at Brown University. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos, Walter Heller, Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Peters, Michel Poitevin, Lloyd Shapley, John Wooders, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and especially Robert Rosenthal for his careful reading of two drafts. The financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 912202 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Political events and the foreign direct investment decision: An empirical examination

This study investigates the impact of political events on US manufacturing direct investment in Latin America. The relationship between foreign direct investment and political events (and economic factors) is examined through regression analysis of pooled time-series (21 years) and cross-sectional (8 countries) data. In contrast to previous studies using an econometric approach, this study finds that political events do affect direct investment decisions. Specifically, both intra-nation and inter-nation conflict and co-operation have an impact on US direct investment decisions concerning Latin American countries. In addition, the host country's market size and market growth affect these decisions by US multinational firms.