Reserve ratios: A proposal for change

The paper addresses the problem of Fed control of the money supply and the inherent instability of a fractional reserve banking system which Friedman covered in A Program for Monetary Stability. While Friedman proposed a 100 percent reserve requirement as a solution, this work suggests a change from imposing legal reserve ratios on specific liabilities to one of imposing them on total bank liabilities. Reserve ratios are compared to tax rates. Friedman's proposal is to increase the tax rate to 100 percent on specific liabilities and pay interest on reserve balances at the Fed. The proposal of this paper is to keep the tax rates (present reserve ratios) but change the tax base. It is shown that the Fed would gain control over the maximum expansion of banks, but would lose direct control over specific liabilities. The Fed would not tax some liabilities and subsidize others. The Fed could concentrate on setting the tone of the money market and allow the public to use whatever set of bank liabilities it desires as money without specific penalty.     

Bureaucrats as "Social Engineers": Federal Welfare Programs in Herbert Hoover's America

A bstract . Historians interested in 20th century American reform often seek to analyze the ideologies of political leaders separately from the institutions that these same leaders created. Such emphases on ideas, as opposed to actions, has, for example, led "revisionist" American historians to argue that the presidencies of Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt were "conceptually continuous." Our examination of the major social welfare programs undertaken by the federal government in the 1920s disputes this claim. Examination of the operations of the federal bureaucracy instead of the rhetoric of politicians demonstrates the existence of decided policy differences between the Hoover and Roosevelt eras. "Efficiency" analogues dominant during the Hoover era were replaced with "direct service-provider" approaches which created a clear distinction between private and public welfare programs. Elements of "continuity" between the two eras have been overdrawn. Background is provided for increased understanding of some of the policy implications of America's contemporary welfare debate—particularly about "rehabilitation" strategies and/or rationales for action in the social welfare field.     

Introduction to the symposium: The discipline of applied general equilibrium

Summary The use of general equilibrium models in applied research imposes a discipline in which model structures can easily be compared and contrasted and model results can be interpreted using a well understood and rigorously developed theoretical framework. These features allow researchers to compare results across modeling efforts and to build on the experience of others in deriving results and formulating questions. This paper first presents a brief critical history of applied general equilibrium analysis. It then summarizes the contributions of eight other papers in this issue.We are grateful to Gary Hansen, Ellen McGrattan, and Richard Rogerson for helpful discussions of this paper. We also want to thank the members of the Applied Theory Workshop at the University of Minnesota, who helped referee and edit the papers in this issue: Fernando Alvarez, Raphael Bergoeing, Betsy Caucutt, Ricardo Cavalcanti, Antonia Diaz, Ron Edwards, Andres Erosa, Terry Fitzgerald, Ron Gecan, Doug Gollin, Karine Moe, François Ortalo-Magne, and Marcelo Veracierto. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

CAPITAL AGGREGATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OBSOLESCENCE-INDUCING TECHNICAL CHANGE

The major question addressed is the treatment of capital embodied technical progress. Should Obsolescence be deducted to calculate a net stock, or should quality adjustments be made in each vintage of new capital, or both, or neither? In order to estimate the contribution of new investment to growth it is necessary to use a capital stock where different vintages are weighted in proportion to their marginal products. The commonly used gross capital measures do not do this, because they do not allow for the higher marginal product of more modern capital. Such an allowance for capital embodied technical progress can be made either by quality adjusting new capital or by incorporating obsolescence into the valuation of the old capital (but not both). However, even if new capital incorporates an allowance for improved quality, it will still be necessary to revalue the old capital. Frequently, a reasonable approximation to the net capital stock results from a linear decline in quasi-rents and can be approximated by published estimates of the stock of capital net of straight line depreciation. Steady technical progress will not lead to the commonly used exponential service decline functions. To avoid overestimating the return to investment when technology changes it will be necessary to use information on capital embodied technical change to revalue old capital, rather than to change the price indices for new capital.     

Computerization and Structural Change

I develop three measures of structural change on the basis of U.S. data: changes in occupational composition, changes in input–output technical coefficients, and changes in capital coefficients. Using pooled cross-section, time-series data for 44 industries over the period from 1970 to 1990, I find that computer investment per worker has had a positive and significant effect on the degree of occupational change and changes in input and capital coefficients.     

Austrian Economics and Public Choice

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

Stationary solution to the overlapping generations model of fiat money: Experimental evidence

Overlapping generations model of fiat money yields an infinity of competitive equilibrium solutions, only one of which is stationary. Economies reported in this paper involved a sequence of overlapping generations of three or four individuals; each individual lived for two periods. In their young age individuals were endowed with chips that could be traded for fiat money wish the individuals of the old generation. In their old age, individuals could exchange their units o flat money for the consumption good. Results of the experiments exhibit some support for the stationary solution. The results are robust to two designs of exchange institutions (double oral auctior and supply schedule auction) and to two different endogenous ways of converting money into chips at the end of the game (average price prevailing during the last period the game is actually played and the average price forecast made during the last period the game is actually played).A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Economic Science Association and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The authors are grateful for comments received from various participants at both presentations. Financial support was provided by the McKnight Foundation, the Honeywell Foundation, National Science Foundation (SES 89-12552), and Richard. M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds.