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31.
The aim of the paper is to compare two alternative survey designs in terms of resultant response rates, non response bias and cost. The first design is a simple postal survey with follow-up mailings; the second design is a two-phase multi-mode design, where the postal survey is followed at the second phase by a telephone survey of non-respondents. We present a case study based on a survey of employers. In this study we find evidence that the sample obtained using only postal methods is biased in important respects. Bias is not apparent in the demographic characteristics of the employees. But bias is observed in some of the employees’ employment characteristics and some of the characteristics of the firms in which they work. The multi mode design seems, overall, to have reduced or removed the bias of the postal sample. Only in marginal respects was some further bias introduced. We also compare costs of the two designs, to enable a comparison of cost-effectiveness at bias reduction.  相似文献   
32.
The aim of this experiment is to test the role of institutional design in credit markets as a commitment device against renegotiation: when there is asymmetric information does a lower degree of centralization enhance efficiency? Does decentralization alleviate the adverse selection problem in credit markets? We run a large‐scale computerized experiment involving 12 different data sets and 3 different uncertainty scenarios on a sample of 120 subjects. The results obtained confirm the superiority of a decentralized institutional framework: the number of poor projects undertaken in a decentralized market was significantly smaller than the number of poor projects undertaken in centralized markets in all the scenarios. This experimental evidence shows that the institutional design is crucial in seeking financial discipline and therefore can shed some light on the debate on ‘Anglo‐Saxon’ versus ‘German–Japanese’ credit practices. (J.E.L.: C90, D82, G21, L10).  相似文献   
33.
We study the Haezendonck risk measure (introduced by [Haezendonck, J., Goovaerts, M., 1982. A new premium calculation principle based on Orlicz norms. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 1, 41–53] and by [Goovaerts, M.J., Kaas, R., Dhaene, J., Tang, Q., 2003. A unified approach to generate risk measures. ASTIN Bulletin 33 (2), 173–191; Goovaerts, M.J., Kaas, R., Dhaene, J., Tang, Q., 2004. Some new classes of consistent risk measures. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 34 (3), 505–516]) and prove its subadditivity. Since the Haezendonck risk measure is defined as an infimum of Orlicz premia, we investigate when the infimum is actually attained. We determine the corresponding generalized scenarios and show how its construction can be seen as a special case of the operation of inf-convolution of convex functionals.  相似文献   
34.
This article presents a case study of the establishment of thefirst Italian supermarket in 1957, carried out by an Americanindustrial group called the International Basic Economy Corporation(IBEC). It raises the question of the export of a model bornin the United States in a far different economic and politicalcontext. It was necessary to transform the technical and structuralaspects of the supermarket as an institution to adapt to Italiansociety. This article also analyzes how other serious problems,deriving from the particular political and juridical situationof Italy, were confronted. In the end, the Italian supermarketwas fundamentally different from the original model.  相似文献   
35.
The literature on the tragedy of the anticommons typically suggests that producers of complementary goods should integrate themselves. Recent decisions by the antitrust authorities seem however to indicate that there exists a tradeoff between the “tragedy” and the lack of competition characterizing an integrated market structure. In this paper we analyze such tradeoff in oligopolistic complementary markets when products are vertically differentiated. We show that quality leadership plays a crucial role. When there is a quality leader, forcing divestitures or prohibiting mergers, thus increasing competition, lowers prices and enhances consumer surplus. However, when quality leadership is shared, “disintegrating” firms may lead to higher prices. In this case, concerns about the tragedy of the anticommons are well posed in antitrust decisions.  相似文献   
36.
Summary. In the evolutionary setting for a financial market developed by Blume and Easley (1992), we consider an infinitely repeated version of a model á la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with asymmetrically informed traders. Informed traders observe the realisation of a payoff relevant signal before making their portfolio decisions. Uninformed traders do not have direct access to this kind of information, but can partially infer it from market prices. As a counterpart for their privileged information, informed traders pay a per period cost. As a result, information acquisition triggers a trade-off in our setting. We prove that, so long as information is costly, uninformed traders survive.JEL Classification Numbers: D50, D82, G14.I am deeply indebted to Luca Anderlini for his helpful guidance. I also benefited from discussion with Larry Blume, David Easley, Jayasri Dutta, Thorsten Hens, Hamid Sabourian, Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé and Hyun Song Shin. Useful comments came from an anonymous referee and participants to seminars in Barcelona, Bielefeld, Cambridge, Manchester, Oxford, Rotterdam, Venice, Zurich, to the PhD Awards Italian tour in Rome, Naples, Padova and Milan, and to ESEM99 and EEA99 in Santiago de Compostela.  相似文献   
37.
We analyze the effects on industry structure of non strategic learning-by-doing with spillovers in a differentiated oligopoly à la Bertrand. The dynamics is driven by a non linear learning curve. Conditions for shakeouts are analyzed, focusing on the key factors affecting them. Policy interventions to limit shakeouts are suggested.   相似文献   
38.
This article examines U.S. REIT leverage decisions and their effects on risk and return. We find that the speed at which REITs close the gap between current debt levels and target leverage levels is 17% annually. REITs that are highly levered relative to the average REIT tend to underperform REITs with less debt in their capital structure. However, REITs that are highly levered relative to their target leverage tend to perform better on a risk‐adjusted basis than under‐levered REITs. Taken together, our results show that REIT leverage has significant return performance effects conditional on deviations from target leverage.  相似文献   
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This article reports the development and initial validation of a multidimensional measure of employability based on the theoretical model of Lo Presti and Pluviano (2016). Four different studies were designed and implemented. Study 1 was a qualitative study that involved a group of 15 labour market experts and aimed at developing the items pool. In Study 2, an exploratory factor analysis of 526 employees was carried out to examine the structure of the employability measure as previously obtained. Study 3 aimed at verifying the employability measure that had emerged from Study 2 through confirmatory factor analysis of 699 employees, resulting in a 28‐item shortened version encompassing the original four employability dimensions. Finally, in Study 4, concurrent and predictive validity of the definitive version of the employability measure were tested on a sample of 712 employees. Implications for vocational guidance and human resource management, as well as future employability research, are discussed.  相似文献   
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