Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model

We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.     

Value and risk in business-to-business e-banking

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of risk in the formation of perceptions of value in the b2b domain, specifically within e-banking. The functional relationships between three types of risk (performance, financial and psychological) and the benefits and sacrifices components of value are tested within a broader nomological network that includes e-service quality (as an antecedent of value) and satisfaction, word-of-mouth and intention to switch (as outcomes of value). The hypothesised relationships are tested, using Partial Least Squares, on data collected through a postal survey from 167 UK-based SME organisations. The results confirm the significant but differential impact of the three types of risk on the two value components. Specifically performance risk and financial risk are found to be significant determinants of benefits, while psychological risk impacts on perceptions of sacrifices. We also provide evidence of the differential impact of the benefits and sacrifices components of value on satisfaction, and the existence of both direct and indirect (through satisfaction) impact of these components on word-of-mouth and intention to switch. This is the first documented empirical investigation of the impact of perceptions of risk in the study of perceptions of value within the domain of b2b marketing and consequently offers new insights into the subject matter. The theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are discussed and the manner in which the identified relationships can aid future research are explicated.     

When do we really need interpersonal trust in globally dispersed new product development teams?

Interpersonal trust refers to the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of another party. Trust is generally acknowledged as fostering knowledge exchange and thus contributing to new product development (NPD) team effectiveness. However, the conditions under which NPD teams come to rely more heavily on trust to facilitate effectiveness remain unclear. With burgeoning global collaboration on new product development, we analyze how the characteristics of global NPD teams, i.e., geographic dispersion, computer‐mediated communication (e.g., e‐mail, video‐conferencing), team membership flexibility, and national diversity moderate the trust–effectiveness relationship. Our results show that trust is more important under the condition of geographic dispersion, computer‐mediated communication, and national diversity. By specifying when trust influences NPD team effectiveness in globally dispersed teams, we discuss the theoretical implications and provide recommendations for management.     

Credit Cards,Economization of Money,and Interest Rates

The quality of textbooks is not the problem in the introductory course. It is the failure to use as supplements books that reveal how economists think and approach issues. A short reading list is provided.     

Elements in participation,teamwork and flexibility in South Africa

This research note involves an investigation of some conceptual issues which arise in the coexistence of direct and indirect forms of participation in three case studies of South African organizations. It is concluded that a managerial paradigm shift from a strong individualistic orientation towards collaborative or collective values could facilitate the process of achieving both economic growth and equity in the workplace.

Elements in participation, teamwork and flexibility in South Africa     

Reparations for African‐Americans as a Transfer Problem: A Cautionary Tale

We examine how different methods of reparations payments to African‐Americans affect both the black and nonblack populations of the United States using the framework of the transfer‐problem from international trade theory as a theoretical foundation. We find that reparations payments that provide incentives for blacks to use the payment toward purchases of goods and services produced by nonblacks might expand the income gap. Also a reparations payment in the absence of productive capacity owned by blacks is found to have no final positive impact on black income. These results indicate that a reparations payment strategy must be carefully and cautiously conceived in order to achieve the desired effects.     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

Takeovers and cooperatives: governance and stability in non-corporate firms

If consumers wholly or partially control a firm with market power they will charge less than the profit maximizing price. Starting at the usual monopoly price, a small price reduction will have a second order effect on profits but a first order effect on consumer surplus. Despite this desirable static result, it has been argued that cooperatives are vulnerable to take-over by outsiders who will run them as for-profit businesses. This paper studies takeovers of cooperatives. We argue that there will not be excessive takeovers of cooperatives due to the Grossman-Hart problem of free riding during takeovers.