Entry threat,entry delay,and Internet speed: The timing of the U.S. broadband rollout

In a rapidly growing industry, potential entrants strategically choose which local markets to enter. Facing the threat of additional entrants, a potential entrant may lower its expectation of future profits and delay entry into a local market, or it may accelerate entry due to preemptive motives. Using the evolution of local market structures of broadband Internet service providers from 1999 to 2007, we find that the former effect dominates the latter after allowing for spatial correlation across markets and accounting for endogenous market structure. On average, it takes 2 years longer for threatened markets to receive their first broadband entrant. Moreover, this entry delay has long‐run negative implications for the divergence of the U.S. broadband infrastructure: 1 year of entry delay translates into an 11% decrease on average present‐day download speeds.     

The Dive and Disruption of Successful Current Products: Measures,Global Patterns,and Predictive Model

This study examines the diffusion of pairs of substitute products (current versus new) in five categories across 86 countries between 1977 and 2011. The study finds that current products reach a peak at about 56% of market penetration. Subsequently, they suffer a dramatic decrease in penetration of 286%, which we call the dive. A dive occurs in 96% of current products in five categories across 86 countries between 1977 and 2011. On average, the time from takeoff of new product to a peak in penetration of the current product is 6.6 years and to the dive of the current product is 8.4 years. The total time‐to‐dive includes a hidden discontinuance period (10.4 years), from the introduction of the new product to the peak of the current product, plus an overt time‐to‐dive (1.8 years), from the peak to the dive of the current product. The hidden discontinuance period and the overt time‐to‐dive are shorter, and the dive is steeper in emerging markets than in developed ones. A discrete‐time hazard model shows that the introduction of the new product, prior penetration of the current product, the population density of the country, and prior dives in other countries predict intercountry the hazard of a peak. Subsequently, takeoff of the new product, relative percentage growth in penetration of the current product prior to a peak, the length of the hidden discontinuance period, and prior dives in other countries predict the hazard of a dive. The models can predict the occurrence of a peak with true positive rate of 62% and a true negative rate of 87%, and a dive with a true positive rate of 82% and a true negative rate of 61%.     

Cutting out the middle-man: The case for direct business involvement in environmental justice

In recent years, environmental concerns have become the first priority for socially-conscious corporations. This article describes the history of the environmental justice movement and its philosophical differences with the mainstream environmental movement. Environmental justice activists allege that the mainstream environmental movement marginalizes the environmental interests of the poor and people of color. Herein, we provide guidance for environmentally-conscious corporations that wish to avoid repeating the same ethical errors.     

MARKET POWER,BANK MEGAMERGERS,AND THE WELFARE OF BANK BORROWERS

We assess the effects on the welfare of corporate borrowers of the recent wave of bank consolidations in the United States that has produced a small number of very large banks. Our evidence from a sample of more than 3,000 commercial borrowers from banks involved in large mergers indicates that the wealth effects on these borrowers are highly negative, statistically significant, and economically important. These negative investor perceptions seem to be driven largely by the expectation of changes in banks’ market power resulting from the mergers.     

The Positive Ethical Organization: Enacting a Living Code of Ethics and Ethical Organizational Identity

A vision of a living code of ethics is proposed to counter the emphasis on negative phenomena in the study of organizational ethics. The living code results from the harmonious interaction of authentic leadership, five key organizational processes (attraction–selection–attrition, socialization, reward systems, decision-making and organizational learning), and an ethical organizational culture (characterized by heightened levels of ethical awareness and a positive climate regarding ethics). The living code is the cognitive, affective, and behavioral manifestation of an ethical organizational identity. We draw on business ethics literature, positive organizational scholarship, and management literature to outline the elements of positive ethical organizations as those exemplary organizations consistently practicing the highest levels of organizational ethics. In a positive ethical organization, the right thing to do is the only thing to do. Amy Klemm Verbos is a Ph.D. candidate at the Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, where she received a Chancellor’s Fellowship, Graduate Fellowship, Dissertation Fellowship, and C. Edward Weber Research Award. She co-authored ‚Positive Relationships in Action: Relational Mentoring and Mentoring Schemas in the Workplace’ in the forthcoming edited book, Positive Relationships at Work. Her work on positive organizing also has been presented at the Academy of Management Conference. Joseph A. Gerard is a Ph.D. student at the Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He is a lecturer at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater teaching organizational behavior, strategy, and accounting. He is a founding member of Ascent Organization Development LLC, which provides management consulting services to for-profit organizations in the areas of effectiveness and performance enhancement. Paul R. Forshey is a Ph.D. student in Organizations and Strategic Management at the Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. His research interests include startup firms and firms in transition. Charles S. Harding is a Ph.D. student in Organizations and Strategic Management at the Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Awarded a Chancellor’s Fellowship, his research interests include strategic decision-making and the role of value creation in strategy. Janice S. Miller is an Associate Professor at the Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee where she has received the Business Advisory Council Award for Teaching Excellence. Her published work has appeared in Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Organizational Behavior, and Journal of Business Ethics among others. She received her Ph.D. in Human Resources Management from Arizona State University.     

Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

We offer a first formal analysis of auctioning retaliation rights within the WTO. We show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders, and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats. If the violating country is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation against it, then the possibility of “auction failure” arises, whereby no bids are made despite positive valuation by bidders. If the violating country is instead permitted to bid, then auction failure is precluded, and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired. We evaluate these different auction formats from normative (revenue, compliance, efficiency) standpoints.     

An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case of state trading enterprises

A central result in the theoretical literature on strategic trade is the ‘rent-shifting hypothesis’, the idea that government’s can employ trade policy as a precommitment device to transfer profit from foreign to domestic firms. To our knowledge, however, the rent-shifting hypothesis remains untested empirically. This paper constructs a theory-based empirical test of rent-shifting behavior that relies on observations of government precommitment variables employed through State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The analysis applies data on the delayed producer payment structure of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and examines its merits as a rent-shifting mechanism in the international durum market. The model fails to reject the hypothesis that the CWB utilizes a pre-commitment mechanism in the international durum market and several nonparametric tests confirm that the observed transfer payments set by the CWB are consistent with rent-shifting behavior in the 1972-95 pre-WTO period.