On the Long-Run Distribution of Capital in the Ramsey Model

We study issues related to the long-run distribution of wealth in two variants of Ramsey's model of optimal capital accumulation. First we show that, in the case where a government levies a progressive income tax, there exist infinitely many stationary equilibria in which all households own positive capital stocks. Moreover, it is demonstrated that non-stationary equilibria can exhibit complicated dynamics. Then we discuss the case where households exercise market power on the capital market and we show that this may also lead to equilibria in which all households own positive amounts of capital. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, O41.     

Multiplier effects in economies with missing risk markets

The paper analyses the impact of pecuniary externalities in a two-sector economy with an incomplete market structure. Agents in each sector choose their proportion of risky investment. Sector specific risks are assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated. It is shown that the economy is more volatile if risk markets do not exist. With a complete set of risk markets, shocks in one sector will be dampened on the aggregate level. In contrast, when risk markets are absent, pecuniary externalities arising from higher risky investment in one sector can create feedback effects in the other sector. When agents are sufficiently risk averse (their coefficient of relative risk aversion being greater than one), an individually optimal response to the increased riskiness of the price distribution will result in an even riskier price distribution: an increase in risky activity in one sector will lead to an increase in risky activity in the other sector, and this gives multiplier effects.Part of this work has been done while I was visiting assistant professor at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.I am grateful to Hans-Werner Sinn for helpful comments. The suggestions of the two referees have contributed to improve the paper considerably.     

Unternehmenskultur und Unternehmenserfolg: Stand der empirischen Forschung und Konsequenzen für die Entwicklung eines Messkonzeptes

Im Rahmen einer übergreifenden Analyse empirischer Arbeiten wird der State-of-the-Art der Forschung zum Zusammenhang von Unternehmenskultur und Unternehmenserfolg dargelegt. Neben der inhaltlichen Analyse des Zusammenhangs liegt der Schwerpunkt des nachfolgenden Beitrags auf einem Review der Messung von Unternehmenskultur und Unternehmenserfolg, wie sie sich in den betrachteten Zusammenhangsanalysen zeigt. Aufbauend hierauf werden die Grundzüge je eines Konzeptes zur Messung der Unternehmenskultur und des Unternehmenserfolges entwickelt, welche als Ausgangsbasis verstanden werden k?nnen, um in weiterführenden Untersuchungen den Zusammenhang von Unternehmenskultur und Unternehmenserfolg für die unterschiedlichsten Unternehmen zu bestimmen.     

SEARCH EXTERNALITIES IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY

The paper gives a survey of the basic features of macroeconomic models with search externalities. It presents a simple static general equilibrium model with search externalities. Within this context the main results characterizing steady state in dynamic search models are reproduced in a simple context. Specifically, the link between transaction technology and strategic complementarity is analysed. It is shown that increasing returns to scale in the transaction technology create feed-back effects and multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria may arise. With economies of scale in matching, fluctuations in the economy can be large even with a low elasticity of search activity. The formal equivalence to models with investment externalities is analysed. In an application to the labour market, the allocative role of wages in the presence of search frictions and hysteresis effects are discussed. General conditions are given under which the set of welfare ranked equilibria is described by a closed loop. Finally, it is shown that with a more general transaction technology, even with constant returns to scale multiple equilibria may occur in the presence of externalities.     

Surviving the EU? The future for national employment models in Europe

The claim by the European Union (EU) to be both the moderniser and the effective saviour of distinctive European ways of doing things is challenged by this review of the multi‐tiered influence of the EU on change in national models. Competition and macroeconomic policy is argued to be more significant than soft law in reshaping national models and in constraining innovation and change to meet new conditions. Lip service is paid by the EU to different paths of development, but the contradictions and synergies across institutional and policy approaches that underpin the notion of varieties of capitalism go unrecognised. European employment models are seen as primarily contributing to social protection, but the potential role for distinctive models to promote comparative advantage, as under varieties of capitalism analysis, is not on the policy agenda.     

Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency

Models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks. Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper, we apply the method of Morris and Shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show—using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies—that their results continue to hold, even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents. We provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack. For the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals, we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks.     

INEQUALITY, MAJORITY VOTING AND THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING

Abstract. This paper documents that in poor countries redistribution in cash is negligible. To the extent that public education funding is redistributive, the lion's share of redistribution in poor countries is through public education budgets. I present a simple model of how inequality determines redistribution through public education spending when funding decisions are made through majority voting. Contrary to T. Persson and G. Tabellini, and contrary to conventional wisdom, in the present model higher inequality leads to less redistribution if the curvature in the utility function is sufficiently high. I argue that large curvature of the utility function is empirically relevant.