EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP IN ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS: THE CASE OF UNITED AIRLINES

This article argues that employee stock ownership transactions (ESOTs) may have decisive advantages in addressing the transition problems associated with significant economic change. Equity ownership by employees can increase value not only because of the better incentive alignment achieved by making employees major stockholders, but also because equity has special value in solving some of the bargaining (i.e., information) problems that can make it especially difficult to renegotiate the em-ployees' contracts with the firm in volatile economic environments. One important question raised by ESOTs is whether they produce a merely transitional organizational form or a relatively permanent form for managing economic change. Do they amount to simply a set of one-time adjustments of economic claims so that we should expect a reversion back to public shareholder ownership? Or do these transactions produce a durable organizational form that proves more effective in negotiating an ongoing series of transition problems? After a general analysis of the potential advantages of ESOTs in cases of economic transition, this article explores this question by examining one particularly interesting example, the recent employee acquisition of majority equity in United Air Lines. The parties in the UAL transaction, which can be traced to the transition shock of airline deregulation in 1978 and the series of competitive struggles that followed, contemplated employee ownership as more than a transitional device. The deal is structured to lock up employee stock in an ESOP and to provide strong employee governance rights for the next 20 years. One of the objectives of the ESOT was to catalyze a cultural change in UAL's operations so that the airline could become more competitive, not just through wage reductions but through operational efficiencies that would require a higher level of employee cooperation. The evidence to date suggests that UAL has become a more efficient competitor, but also that governance pressure from the employees where their economic interests are directly at stake is potentially destabilizing. The UAL case shows that adjustment to prosperity can raise problems almost as difficult as adjustment to economic adversity.     

Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage

We find that firms protected by second generation state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.     

Author’s Reply: Statistical Independence and Fractional Age Assumptions - Discussion by Cecil Nesbitt; Elias S. W. Shiu; Serena Tiong,January 1997

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of the sharing of longevity risk between an annuity provider and a group of annuitants. An appropriate longevity index is designed in order to adapt the amount of the periodic payments in life annuity contracts. This accounts for unexpected longevity improvements experienced by a given reference population. The approach described in the present paper is in contrast with group self-annuitization, where annuitants bear their own risk. Here the annuitants bear only the nondiversifiable risk that the future mortality trend departs from that of the reference forecast. In that respect, the life annuities discussed in this paper are substitutes for reinsurance and securitization of longevity risk.     

On the Moments of the Time of Ruin with Applications to Phase-Type Claims

Abstract

We describe an approach to the evaluation of the moments of the time of ruin in the classical Poisson risk model. The methodology employed involves the expression of these moments in terms of linear combinations of convolutions involving compound negative binomial distributions. We then adapt the results for use in the practically important case involving phase-type claim size distributions. We present numerical examples to illuminate the influence of claim size variability on the moments of the time of ruin.     

Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements

We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex system of business relationships between various Internet entities (e.g., Autonomous Systems, enterprise networks, residential customers). In our model we are given a network topology of nodes and links where the nodes act as the players of the game, and links represent potential contracts. Nodes wish to satisfy their demands, which earn potential revenues, but may have to pay their neighbors for links incident to them. We incorporate some of the qualities of Internet business relationships, including customer–provider and peering contracts. We show that every Nash equilibrium can be represented by a circulation flow of utility with certain constraints. This allows us to prove bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability. We also focus on the quality of equilibria achievable through centralized incentives.