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81.
R. G. Walker 《Accounting & Business Research》2013,43(16):286-296
82.
Using a difference-in-differences estimation framework and state-level data, we investigate the potential role of HIV/AIDS in contributing to declining abortion utilization in the United States. Our results suggest that the perceived risk of HIV contraction negatively affected unwanted pregnancies. Specifically, a 10% increase in HIV incidence is associated with 0.34–1.1% fewer abortions per live births, an effect that can account for at least one-tenth of the sharp decline in abortions observed from the early 1980s to mid-1990s. 相似文献
83.
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The purpose of this note is to examine incumbent behaviour and patterns of entry under R&D competition with spillovers. We find that, in addition to blockading, deterring and accommodating entry, the incumbent may also solicit entry. Entry solicitation occurs when the incumbent strategically alters its R&D commitment in order to take advantage of the spillover generated by the entrant's subsequent R&D investment. Although our results are placed in the context of R&D with spillovers, they are applicable to a wider class of models involving positive externalities, particularly network externalities.
JEL Classification Numbers: L12, O31. 相似文献
JEL Classification Numbers: L12, O31. 相似文献
86.
87.
Donald A. Walker 《Journal of economic issues》2013,47(3):649-680
Mainstream economists and liberal politicians are criticizing the Third Way as it is being applied in the Netherlands. They argue that mutual consultation precludes an efficient adaptation to disturbances. The present study analyzes changes in wage and income policy in the Netherlands until 2005. It finds that wage and income policy has proven to be flexible enough to address “new” challenges in the Netherlands. The flexibility is rooted in a culture of tolerance that allows for some breaking of working rules. The latter arises from bounded socialization, that is, the imperfect transmission of information with respect to social working rules that result in similar but not identical copies of institutions. 相似文献
88.
Wendell Gordon 《Journal of economic issues》2013,47(2):305-310
89.
Pascal Frantz Norvald Instefjord Martin Walker 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2013,40(9-10):1184-1220
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure. 相似文献
90.
The basic thesis of this exploratory investigation was that a corporate strategy perspective may complement the traditional financial paradigm in explaining capital structure in large U.S. corporations. Earlier fusion of strategic and financial literature led to a series of propositions antecedent to this work. Inclusion of Rumelt's diversification categories plus elsewhere validated financial contextual variables led to hypotheses for the present study. Results suggest a managerial choice perspective may help to explain the capital structure choice at the firm level of analysis. 相似文献