Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms

In standard models of the labor-managed firm, labor is misallocated in the short run. This problem can be eliminated by introducing a market for membership in each firm. These markets substitute for the capitalist labor market and support equilibria isomorphic to Walrasian equilibria. Such LMFs resemble familiar Ward-Domar-Vanek LMFs by ensuring that firm sizes are optimal for ex post members, but they also have the property that firm sizes are optimal for workers endowed with ex ante membership rights.     

The choice of numeraire,capital intensity uniqueness,and the reswiritching of techniques

This paper examines the condition for capital-intensity uniqueness and the phenomenon of reswitching of techniques in a two-sector linear capital model when the prices and wages are measured in terms of the value of net output per man (the Sraffa numeraire). It is shown that when the Sraffa numeraire is used, a) the capital-intensity condition is not sufficient to ensure a unique relationship between the value of capital per man and the rate of profit; and b) reswitching of techniques is possible even if there is only one capital good in the system. The results arise only from the interaction between the price and composition effects in the model using the Sraffa numeraire.     

The Influence of Role Models on Negotiation Ethics of College Students

Role models can be highly influential in conveying ethical standards. This study investigates the influence various categories of role models have had on a population of over 1,600 undergraduate students in Texas, Oregon and Michigan. Those identifying clergy, boy scout leaders, friends and college advisors as role models exhibited less willingness to adopt questionable ethical behavior in negotation situations. Journalist and spouse role models tended to cause students to be more accepting of questionable behavior. Individuals with strong end-result and social contract ethical philosophies, as well as males and those who served in the military exhibited strong tendencies toward less than ethical behavior. Individuals with strong rule ethical philosophy, high levels of religiousity, and those with a cooperative attitude in negotiations tended to adopt higher ethical standards in negotiations.     

VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO-ECONOMY*

This paper presents a macroeconomic model where governments are motivated both by their ideological preference for alternative fiscal policies that vary in their short run and long run consequences and by their reelection prospects. I prove that a sequential equilibrium exists in which moderate incumbents compromise their ideologies in order to get reelected, while extreme governments forego reelection but tie the hands of their successors. The view implied by this model is that incumbent governments, in order to get reelected, do not ideologically differentiate themselves from one another since such behavior is likely to result in loss of office. Alternatively, governments that are either subsequently not reelected or are lame ducks pursue ideologically preferred policies since they are less constrained by the electorate.