Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

A Note on Minimax Mixture of Distributions Free Procedure for Inventory Model with Variable Lead Time

In recent papers, Moon and Choi (1998) and Hariga and Ben-Daya (1999)considered a continuous review inventory model with a mixture of backordersand lost sales in which the lead time, the order quantity, and the reorder pointare decision variables was studied. Moreover, they also develop a minimaxdistribution free procedure for the problem. While the demands of differentcustomers are not identical in the lead time, then we can't only use a singledistribution (such as Moon & Choi (1998) and Hariga & Ben-Daya (1999))to describe the demand of the lead time. Hence, we correct and extend the modelof Moon and Choi (1998) and Hariga and Ben-Daya (1999) by considering thelead time demand with the mixture of distributions. In addition, we also applythe minimax mixture of distributions free approach to the model by simultaneouslyoptimizing the order quantity, the reorder point, and the lead time to devise a practical procedure which can be used without specific information on demand distribution.     

中国乡村公共品的提供:连带团体的作用

在威权和转轨体制下，民主和官僚政治制度通常很薄弱，为什么处于这种制度下的政府官员所提供的公共品，往往还超过了足够维护社会稳定所需的最低水平呢？案例研究表明，即使正式责任制度很薄弱，非官方惯例和规则的约束仍然能够促使当地官员设立并履行其公共责任。而这些非正式责任制度由特定类型的连带团体提供并在全社区发挥其道德权威。在其他条件都相同的情况下，存在这类集团的村庄比没有这类集团的村庄更有可能获得较好的公共品供应。     

Are There Differential Effects of Price and Policy on College Students’Drinking Intensity?

This article investigates the impact of campus bans on alcohol use and the price of alcohol on college students'drinking intensity. The impact of a campus ban on drinking appears to depend on the ability of students to substitute off-campus access to alcohol for on-campus access. Where few off-campus alternatives exist, campus bans reduce the odds that a student becomes a heavy drinker but have no impact on the odds of transitioning from abstainer to drinker. Where off-campus alternatives are more plentiful, campus bans are less effective. Increasing the price of alcohol appears to be equally effective at reducing the likelihood of drinking and heavy drinking. (JEL)     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

Bargaining Strength and Property Class in Office Markets

This paper examines the influence of bargaining power and property class on the prices of heterogeneous goods. Specifically, it explores the impact of buyer and seller characteristics on the transaction prices of office properties. The empirical model is based on the work of Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003), which developed a method to distinguish between the impact of buyer and seller attributes on bargaining power and the choice of otherwise unidentified price effects (i.e., property class) in the context of hedonic price models. The data set contains information on transaction prices of office properties in Cook, DuPage, and Lake Counties, Illinois from 1995 to 1997. The results reveal systematic differences in bargaining power and property class for certain groups of buyers and sellers contained within the sample.     

When Research Meets Development: Antecedents and Implications of Transfer Speed

This paper focuses on the organization of new product development in large, R&D‐intensive firms. In these firms, research and development activities are often separated. Research is conducted in dedicated research projects at specialized research labs. Once research results are achieved by research projects, they are transferred to business units for further development and commercialization. We investigate the speed whereby research projects transfer their first research results to business units (hereafter: transfer speed). In particular, we analyze the antecedents and performance implications of transfer speed. Based on data of 503 research projects from a European R&D intensive manufacturing firm, our results suggest that a fast transfer speed (as measured by the time it takes for a research project to develop and transfer its first research result to business units) is associated with a better research performance (as measured by the total number of transfers the research project generates). Moreover, we find that different types of external R&D partners—science‐based and market‐based partners—play distinct roles in speeding up project first research transfers. While market‐based partnerships (i.e., customers and suppliers) generally contribute to a faster transfer of first research results, science‐based partnerships (i.e., universities and research institutions) only speed up first research transfers of technologically very complex projects. Our results also show that early patent filings by research projects accelerate first research transfers.     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.