Technical innovation and 3.5 mobile phone generation: Lessons from Korea

In 1996, the Korean mobile communication market was the first in the world to commercialize the code division multiple access (CDMA). Since then, the voice-based mobile phone market has continued to grow and has now reached near saturation. Having recognized the potential of the mobile data service as a new source of profit, telecommunication operators are scrambling to evolve 3.5 generation (3.5G) technology in order to lead market competition. Recently, the Korean 3.5G mobile telecom market has faced stiff competition from CDMA-based EVDO Rev.A and global system for mobile telecommunications (GSM)-based high-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA). In addition, the world's first wireless LAN-based wireless broadband internet (WiBro) service was commercialized in June, 2006. This paper reviews the current status of the 3.5G technology and analyzes the service standardization strategies from the viewpoint of technological evolutions. This paper also suggests implications for Korea's specific circumstances where different mobile telecom technologies complement and compete with one another. Korea's experiences may serve as important lessons for other countries or operators who try to introduce the 3G and look beyond mobile telecom technologies.     

Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing

This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.      

Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm- and country-specific determinants

We analyze the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our analysis yields two new results. First, we find that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly assume equal impact of these determinants. Second, although we concur with the conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage.     

证券法上的民事责任功能研究

我国证券市场在短短十几年的时间内,在募集资金、推动国有大中型企业改制、优化资源配置等方面发挥了不可替代的重要作用.但不容乐观的是伴随着证券市场的发展各种违法违规现象在不断发生.尽管我国对证券违法行为明令禁止,并对严重的违法行为加以行政处罚甚至刑事制裁,然而证券市场上的违法行为仍然禁而不止.究其原因,除了管理层对证券市场发展的总体政策摇摆不定,监管者对违法行为处理不力等因素外,证券法上未建立完善的民事责任制度是重要的原因.本文从证券法上的民事责任功能的探讨入手,阐述了证券法上的民事责任具有的功能是证券刑事责任、行政责任所不能替代的原因,进而论证了建立完善的证券民事责任的必要性.     

Intelligent Order Matching Systems for Commodity Markets

Automatic order matching systems have emerged as an electronic alternative to traditional markets. In current automatic order matching systems, price and quantity are the only product dimensions used for the order matching. However, a single-commodity market is made up of many heterogeneous goods which are close to each other but different in qualities and delivery conditions. Price and quantity are important but represent only parts of product attributes that commodity traders want to take into account. This study aims to extend current automatic order matching systems by diversifying product dimensions. An intelligent order matching system not only maximizes the total transaction volume based on the price and quantity but also satisfies traders' qualitative preferences over attributes other than price and quantity. The intelligent order matching mechanism combines an economic model with a preference model to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative utility of market participants. Constraint logic programming is investigated as a new information technology to structure and implement the intelligent order matching system.     

基于异构数据库的企业产品质量控制模型设计

企业产品质量控制是一项复杂的系统工程,来自不同生产单元的数据具有较强的异构性,不利于质量控制系统的整合。基于XML的数据集成方案为解决这一问题提供了可能。文章探讨了基于XML的质量控制模型的架构,为产品质量控制提供了一个较好的平台。     

从欧盟《电子垃圾处理法》的出台看国际贸易技术壁垒

世界贸易组织成立后，国际贸易中的保护措施发生了较大的变化。其中关于技术方面的贸易保护措施日益引起各国的高度重视。最近通过的欧盟《电子垃圾处理法》就是其中的一例。笔者在此主要讨论了该法的由来、对中国电子行业产生的影响及其带来的启示。     

建筑工程管理中全过程造价控制对策研究

随着社会经济和科学技术的发展,建筑工程如雨后春笋般涌现出来,规模也呈现出不断扩大的趋势.在对建筑工程进行管理的过程当中,工程造价是一个十分重要的因素,但是,要想在建筑工程当中对工程的造价进行良好的控制是十分不容易的,并且工程造价贯穿于施工的全过程.因此,要对工程造价进行全面良好的控制.     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.