On the timeliness of tax reform

This paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance. Quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption, but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits. Tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors, and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others. Such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity, and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion, than would a less reactive government strategy. Efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings, with possible associated costs, or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation.     

2004年加拿大预防血透病人医院血流感染的成本-效益分析

目的：血液透析相关的血流感染是一个严重的公共健康问题,因为加拿大的血液透析病人从1996年到2005翻了一番。本研究目的在于确定加拿大医院血流感染的成本,估算在综合性医院中建立感染控制项目的成本,并进行成本-效益分析。材料与方法：用加拿大医院感染监测项目的数据来估算医院血流感染的发生率。用加拿大健康信息所数据来估算2004年加拿大平均一次血流感染住院的额外成本。建立和维护一个感染控制项目的成本用美国疾病预防与控制中心1985年的成本换算为2004年的加拿大成本来估算。假设感染控制项目能降低医院血流感染病例的20％～30％。结果：2004年的加拿大15278名血液透析病人中估计共有2524人发生血流感染。全年用于治疗血流感染的成本估计为4901万加元。医院血流感染预防和人力资源的总投资成本为815万加元。建立医院感染控制项目后能带来1452万加元的医疗成本节约。效益成本比在1．0：1到1．8：1之间。结论：本研究提供的证据表明,如果医院感染控制项目能降低20％～30％的感染,该项目的经济效益将远超过增加的成本。医院感染控制项目将带来双重效益：节约货币成本的同时改善医疗质量。     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

Does trade foster contract enforcement?

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development. Presented to the GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’, 8 and 9 June, 2007. An earlier version of this paper under another title was presented to the American Economic Association meetings, January 2004.     

Reassessing Moral Legitimacy in Times of Instability

The presence of conflicting cues about what is legitimate provided by various stakeholders, begs the question of how the legitimacy of contested institutionalized practices is justified. Recent critique of tax minimization strategies exemplifies this difficulty: on one hand, practitioners need to increase shareholders' profits; on the other, a growing number of stakeholders push for ‘fairer’ corporate tax payments. Conducted during a time of public criticism of Australian corporate tax strategies, our study draws on justifications of corporate tax minimization strategies by senior tax practitioners and corporate submissions to a Senate Inquiry on corporate tax avoidance. The study explores how legitimacy judgements come under pressure by conflicting cues. Through the application of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) Economies of Worth (EW) framework, we advance legitimacy scholarship by clarifying what constitutes situated judgements in times of instability. Our work puts forward the concept of perceived forecasted consensus as a guide for individuals in making situated legitimacy judgements in times of instability.     

Do former athletes make better managers? Evidence from a partially adaptive grouped-data regression model

The goal of this paper is to introduce a partially adaptive estimator for the grouped-data regression model based on an error structure described by a mixture of two normal distributions. The model we introduce is easily estimated by maximum likelihood using the EM algorithm adapted from the work of Bartolucci and Scaccia (Comput Stat Data Anal 48:821–834, 2005). The partially adaptive estimator is applied to data used by Long and Caudill (Rev Econ Stat 73:525–531, 1991) to examine the impact of intercollegiate athletics on income. We estimate a variation of the original regression model and find that there is a considerable financial advantage for those male athletes now working in business management. This finding is consistent with the idea that athletes acquire team-building and organizational skills that are helpful in business.     

Economic Analysis for the UK National Ecosystem Assessment: Synthesis and Scenario Valuation of Changes in Ecosystem Services

We combine natural science modelling and valuation techniques to present economic analyses of a variety of land use change scenarios generated for the UK National Ecosystem Assessment. Specifically, the agricultural, greenhouse gas, recreational and urban greenspace impacts of the envisioned land use changes are valued. Particular attention is given to the incorporation of spatial variation in the natural environment and to addressing issues such as biodiversity impacts where reliable values are not available. Results show that the incorporation of ecosystem services and their values within analyses can substantially change decisions.     

Capital Controls,Global Liquidity Traps,and the International Policy Trilemma*

The zero bound on interest rates introduces a new dimension to the trilemma in international policy. The openness of the international financial market might render monetary policy ineffective, even within a system of fully flexible exchange rates, because shocks that lead to a liquidity trap in one country are propagated through financial markets to other countries. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be restored by the imposition of capital controls. We derive the optimal response of monetary policy to a global liquidity trap in the presence of capital controls. We show that, even though capital controls might facilitate effective monetary policy, capital controls are not generally desirable in terms of welfare.     

Tests of Hypotheses Arising In the Correlated Random Coefficient Model

This paper examines the correlated random coefficient model. It extends the analysis of Swamy (1971), who pioneered the uncorrelated random coefficient model in economics. We develop the properties of the correlated random coefficient model and derive a new representation of the variance of the instrumental variable estimator for that model. We develop tests of the validity of the correlated random coefficient model against the null hypothesis of the uncorrelated random coefficient model.     

Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising

This article provides evidence on the determinants of royaltiesand upfront fees in share contracts by examining how state franchisetermination laws affect franchise contracts. The results areconsistent with the joint hypothesis that the two-sided moralhazard model explains the terms in franchise contracts and thattermination laws increase the relative importance of franchisoreffort (due to the extra effort that is required to controlsystem quality). I find that franchise companies that are headquarteredin termination-law states charge significantly higher royaltyrates than companies headquartered in other states (around 1%higher). Correspondingly, the initial franchise fees are lowerfor companies headquartered in termination states. Overall,franchisees appear to pay a higher price for franchises in stateswith protection laws. Consistent with a basic tenet of law andeconomics, price adjustments appear to offset at least someof the transfers that would otherwise be implied by the laws.