Maximization,replication, and the economic rationality of positive economic science

This paper argues that gross, short-term capital mobility is excessive, but that long-term net capital mobility remains low. This combination of extremely high gross, but low net capital mobility can create great difficulties in achieving full employment. However, these difficulties fundamentally depend on the political structure and the choices made in individual nations; they do not result from technological advances, such as innovations in computers and communication. Faced with short-term capital mobility, groups and classes within nations have made political choices that hinder the ability of the nation to reach full employment. But other choices can be made.Nations can adopt political structures and rules of the game that reduce the constraints to achieving full employment.     

A bank runs model with a continuum of types

We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agents? behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.     

The Lowry Model Revisited: Incorporating a Multizonal Input-Output Model into an Urban Land Use Allocation Model

This paper formulates a new generation of Lowry-style models that combine a multizonal input-output model and an urban land use allocation model. Three different types of models are proposed: 1) an unconstrained model, 2) a primal of a linear programming approach that includes land supply constraints, and 3) a modified dual of the linear programming approach that allocates land based on additional conditions of economic efficiency. The modified dual formulation improves upon the limitations of Lowry models and their derivatives. First, the proposed model has sound theoretical underpinnings that incorporate the production theory of input-output models and the behavioral theory of optimization models. Second, the proposed model allocates land on the basis of economic efficiency by imposing a procedure that equalizes shadow prices. And third, the proposed model is an optimization model that fully accounts for the spatial and sectoral relationships of multiplier effects determining land use demand.     

Capital-tax financing and scale economies in public-input production

Contrary to the dominant view of inefficient tax competition, Oates and Schwab (1991) show that capital-tax financing of public inputs leads to efficiency when the supply of these inputs is conditioned on business investment (Oates, W.E., Schwab, R.M., 1991. The allocative and distributive implications of local fiscal competition). This paper demonstrates that the cost structure of public-input production is relevant to their proposition on efficient capital-tax financing. That proposition holds if the per-unit cost of public inputs is exogenously fixed; however, it does not hold if public-input production exhibits scale economies. Also, this paper compares our analysis with the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model. That comparison illustrates the importance of the way public inputs are rationed to private firms.     

The global LeChatelier Principle and multimarket equilibria

LeChatelier (Comptes Rendus 99:786, 1884) and LeChatelier (Ann Mines 13(2):157, 1888) proposed that the adjustment of a physical system to a disturbance in its equilibrium was smaller as constraints are added to the adjustment process. Samuelson (Econometrica 28:368–379, 1960) showed that this Principle applied to a stable multimarket equilibrium for the case that all commodities are gross substitutes. We note that the Principle also applies to the stable equilibria of markets for which commodities can also be gross complements as formulated by Morishima (Osaka Econ Pap 1:101–113, 1952). Further, the Morishima and gross substitute cases are the only cases to which the Principle can apply, based only upon the stability hypothesis and a specification of the gross substitute/complement relations among commodities. We show that the Milgrom and Shannon (Econometrica 62:157–180, 1994) single crossing conditions specified for monotone comparative statics can be configured appropriate to the Morishima case to give global conditions for the LeChatelier Principle to apply to a multimarket equilibrium.     

Retroactive Liability or the Public Purse?

The article addresses the question of whether responsibility for pollution created in the past should be retroactively applied to firms, or if the costs of cleaning up existing pollution should be financed by the public. We show that making firms liable for retrospective environmental costs can weaken the incentive to take precautions against future environmental costs. This follows since public financing of these costs can lead to greater prospective risk deterrence by allowing firms to more fully internalize the costs of future environmental risks. However, an analysis of existing public financing approaches highlights a set of dangers associated with their practical use.