The perception of difficulty in project-work planning and its impact on resource sharing

Managers both competent and willing to share resources can be critical to the performance of the multi-project settings increasingly common to modern organizations. Drawing on theoretical perspectives from the psychological ownership literature, we examine the impact of project manager (PM) task self-efficacy and perceptions of project work-planning difficulty on resource sharing behaviors. In this study we use a laboratory experiment involving practicing PMs to elicit work assignments for their subordinate team-members across a series of predefined projects. We control for the difficulty of these assignment tasks and follow-up by inquiring into the willingness of the PMs to share human resources that they’ve assigned to work in these projects. The results from the experiment involving 161 professional PMs suggest that difficulty in project work-planning in general has a significant impact on sharing behaviors. Consistent with the implications of psychological ownership theory, this relationship is significantly moderated by project managers’ task self-efficacy. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set

This paper disentangles the topological assumptions of classical results (e.g.,Walker, 1977 on the existence of maximal elements from rationality conditions. It is known from the social choice literature that under the standard topological conditions—with no rationality assumptions on preferences—there is an element such that the upper section of strict preference at that element is minimal in terms of set inclusion, i.e., the uncovered set is nonempty. Assuming the finite subordination property, a condition that weakens known acyclicity and convexity assumptions, each such uncovered alternative is in fact maximal. Implications are a generalization of a result of Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) on semi-convexity, an extension of Fan’s (1961) lemma on KKM correspondences, and the existence of fixed points for subordinate convex correspondences generalizing the work of Browder (1968).     

An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments

When agents have quasi-linear preferences, every incentive compatible social choice function can be implemented by a simple extensive form mechanism, even if agents are allowed to use mixed strategies. The second stage of the mechanism, which is used to elicit the agents' true preferences, is not reached in equilibrium; it gives agents strict dominant strategies, so equilibrium outcomes are not sensitive to agents' beliefs off the equilibrium path. This solves the multiple equilibrium problem of a principal facing several agents: the mechanism implements any solution to the principal's second best maximization problem. The specification of incentive compatibility constraints in the principal's problem presupposes a precise knowledge of the agents' beliefs. However, the above mechanism can be modified to implement the principal's second best (to within arbitrarily small perturbations of transfers), regardless of the agents' conditional beliefs. Received: 30 April 1997 / Accepted: 16 September 1997     

PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR GENDER PAY EQUITY

Equal pay for work of equal value has come to be almost inextricably associated with the application of job evaluation. Current trends towards performance-related pay systems pose a potential threat to the pursuit of greater gender pay equality as discretion in pay determination increases and there is no clear relationship between earnings and job grade. This paper examines the basis for this view drawing upon the now widespread literature and research into performance-related pay. the argument is made that the problem for gender equality lies both in the nature of the payment system and in the context in which it is being applied, including the changes in the nature of employment relationships that are accompanying these developments. While some women may benefit, overall the moves towards a widening income dispersion and the increased importance of management discretion and appraisal are likely to disadvantage women. However, the individualization of pay is likely to lead to further fragmentation of the interests of women, reducing the likelihood of collective resistance. Opportunities to monitor pay trends will also decrease as the spread of performance-related pay reduces the transparency of the labour market.     

Business plan proposals for inner-city neighborhoods: A Strategic Management assignment for MBA students at Loyola University Chicago

Beginning in 1992, MBA students enrolled in a capstone Strategic Management course at Loyola University Chicago have, as their major course assignment, researched and prepared an original business plan proposal to provide a needed good or service, as well as employment opportunities, to residents in one of Chicago's underserved innercity neighborhoods. This paper describes the genesis of the project, how it works, and what the outcomes have been to date. The pedagogical model is arguably appropriate for MBA programs in or near any area that is economically underdeveloped, be it urban or rural.Jill W. Graham is Associate Professor of Management at Loyola University Chicago, where she teaches the capstone strategy course to both undergraduates and MBA students. Her research concerns various forms of virtue in organizational life, including principled dissent, organizational citizenship behavior, activist loyalty, servant leadership, and value-driven strategic management. Graham received her Ph.D. in organization behavior from Northwestern University in 1983, and taught at the University of British Columbia before joining the Loyola faculty in 1986.     

Airing Your Dirty Laundry: A Quick Marketable Pollution Permits Game for the Classroom

In this article, the authors describe a simple classroom game that demonstrates the advantage of tradable emissions permits in regulating environmental pollution. Students take on the role of polluters who must consider the costs of complying with a uniform reduction and a tradable permits program. The class is divided into high-cost polluters and low-cost polluters so students can observe the gains from trade as high-cost students purchase pollution rights from the low-cost students in the tradable permits scenario. A major advantage of the game is that it can be conducted within as little as 20 minutes and does not require that students have prior knowledge of economics or regulatory policies. This makes the game appropriate for economics and noneconomics courses alike.