Liquidity risk and stock returns around the world

The recent global financial crisis demonstrates that market liquidity is a prominent systematic risk globally. We find that local liquidity risk, in addition to the local market, value and size factors, demands a systematic premium across stocks in 11 developed markets. This local pricing premium is smaller in countries where the country-level corporate boards are more effective and where there are less insider trading activities. We also discover that global liquidity risk is a significant pricing factor across all developed country market portfolios after controlling for global market, value, and size factors. The contribution of this risk to the return on a country market portfolio is economically and statistically significant within and across regions.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries

This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the “dominant” firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generally performs well in highly concentrated markets. We also derive error bounds for evaluating the performance of POE for cases where MPE cannot be computed.     

What Plato Knew About Enron

This paper applies Plato’s cave allegory to Enron’s success and downfall. Plato’s famous tale of cave dwellers illustrates the different levels of truth and understanding. These levels include images, the sources of images, and the ultimate reality behind both. The paper first describes these levels of perception as they apply to Plato’s cave dwellers and then provides a brief history of the rise of Enron. Then we apply Plato’s levels of understanding to Enron, showing how the company created its image and presented information to support that image, and how the public eventually emerged from the cave to realize the truth about Enron’s actual accounting practices and financial state, which led to the corporation’s downfall. We find Plato’s allegory both useful in analyzing the relationship between Enron and the public and instructive about the power and moral responsibility of Enron’s executives.     

Institutionelle Unabhängigkeit als Freiheit vom Recht?

Die politische Unabh?ngigkeit der Europ?ischen Zentralbank wurde in den entsprechenden Vertr?gen gesichert. Wie sieht es aber mit ihrer Rechtsbindung aus? Wer kann die EZB vor Gericht aufgrund von Pfl ichtverletzungen verklagen und ist dies grunds?tzlich überhaupt m?glich? Diesen Fragen geht der Autor hier nach. Er widmet den Beitrag Ernst-Joachim Mestm?cker zu seinem 85. Geburtstag am 25. September.     

国际制裁缘何难以奏效?——“非故意后果”的视角

国际制裁一直面临着有效性不足的困境。既有研究将之归因于制裁有效性发挥的三大必要条件——足够的制裁强度、准确的承受主体和可信的制裁承诺——得不到满足,但忽视了制裁的非故意后果的作用。非故意后果是制约国际制裁有效性的重要因素之一,它削弱了制裁方的意志,却增强了被制裁方的抵抗决心;增加了制裁持续时长和制裁成本,却阻碍了主要制裁目标的实现。在既有研究基础上,作者首先提出了一个探讨制裁的非故意后果的分析框架,其次对非故意后果影响制裁有效性的作用机制进行了分析,最后以联合国为例探讨了制裁方在应对非故意后果问题上的尝试。     

THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING ON AGGREGATE INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION

It has been widely argued that the purpose of corporate restructuring during the 1980s was to produce a population of more industry-specialized, competitive firms in response to intensifying global competition. A number of studies show that corporate restructuring resulted in increased corporate focus during the 1980s. However, no study has yet examined whether corporate restructuring resulted in increased specialization at the industry level during the 1980s. This study examines this issue. First, we examine whether or not aggregate industry specialization increased during the 1980s. That is, we ask: did the average firm in any given U.S. industry become more or less specialized to that industry during the 1980s? Second, we examine whether corporate restructuring was a significant determinant of change in aggregate industry specialization during the 1980s. Using a sample of 686 four-digit SIC industries and 64 two-digit industry groups, this study finds that aggregate industry specialization declined very slightly at both the four-digit and two-digit level between 1981 and 1989. This study also finds that sell-offs of establishments through corporate control transactions or interfirm asset sales had no significant effect on aggregate industry specialization.     

A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE COMPETITIVE POSITIONS AND ENTRY PATHS OF EUROPEAN FIRMS IN THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET

This paper combines the statistical insights of dynamic strategic group analysis with the qualitative richness of historical analysis to explore the modes of entry, expansion paths, and competitive postures of European firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. Patterns of entry and market development over a 20-year period are analyzed. The roles of strategic assets and competencies in determining both the entry strategy and the final competitive posture of these firms in the U.S. market are discussed.