Income distribution and income dynamics in the United Kingdom

In this paper, we propose a model of income dynamics which takes account of mobility both within and between jobs. The model is a hybrid of the mover‐stayer model of income dynamics and a geometric random walk. In any period, individuals face a discrete probability of ‘moving’, in which case their income is a random drawn from a stationary recurrent distribution. Otherwise, they ‘stay’ and incomes follow a geometric random walk. The model is estimated on income transition data for the United Kingdom from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and provides a good explanation of observed non‐linearities in income dynamics. The steady‐state distribution of the model provides a good fit for the observed, cross‐sectional distribution of earnings. We also evaluate the impact of tertiary education on income transitions and on the long‐run distribution of incomes. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Good Performers Bad Acquirers?

We examine how the market reacts to announcements of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by well‐performing acquirers and evaluate the results in light of three hypotheses: 1) managerial ability, 2) empire building, and 3) chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence. Our results indicate that an empire‐building motive drives the relationship between past superior operating performance and M&A announcements. Long‐term operating performance drops significantly for acquiring firms with past superior operating performance. Our evidence also indicates that the presence of insider directors helps to alleviate the negative perception of acquisitions made by firms with better operating performance or empire‐building CEOs.     

The Interpretation of Information and Corporate Disclosure Strategies

This paper analyzes a setting in which a firm's manager can credibly disclose facts, but not their valuation implications. Consequently, he is uncertain as to how those disclosed facts will be interpreted by investors. Introducing such uncertainty affects the manager's disclosure strategy in two important ways. First, it becomes a function of the market's prior valuation of the firm since that valuation provides a clue as to how future disclosures are likely to be interpreted by investors. Second, the disclosure strategy is no longer characterized, in general, by a single good news/bad news partition of the manager's private information.     

Re-examining the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid: does political stability matter?

While past studies had conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of foreign aid on growth and development of a nation, recent studies have tried to delve deeper into the question, ‘what makes aid work?’ (see, Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson, 2013; Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; Svensson, 1999). This paper tests how political stability (vis-à-vis political instability) affects the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid. Applying dynamic panel estimators, our results show that political stability affects aid’s effectiveness on domestic capital formation. The paper considers alternative measures of political stability (vis-à-vis instability), focusing on the political characteristics of a system that have the potential to make a nation stable. Political stability affects policy selection by the government positively and, thus, public resources such as foreign aid are put to the desired use. The estimated marginal impacts show that foreign aid enhances domestic investment in the presence of a stable political climate, but there is a diminishing return to aid.     

Evaluation and Selection of Sustainable Strategy for Green Supply Chain Management Implementation

The aim of this study is to explore the implementation of green supply chain management (GSCM) strategies and to select the best GSCM strategy using fuzzy analytical network process (ANP) methodology. The ANP helps in analyzing the interdependence and interrelations among the various determinants and dimensions of GSCM strategy selection. Fuzzy set theory is applied to avoid the vagueness and uncertainty in human preference judgement. This study uses an empirical case study of an Indian automobile organization to validate the applicability of the proposed model. The results show that the resource based strategy is in first position, having the maximum impact on each determinant. The case organization should improve the green management system with the assistance of a suitable GSCM strategy, i.e. the resource based strategy. This study may help managers to make decisions, and to analyze and standardize their environmental advantages dynamically. The robustness of the projected model is checked by conducting a sensitivity analysis. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Discussion of “Dynamic performance measurement with intangible assets”

Carona (2008) investigates the roles of nonfinancial performance indicators and long-term commitments in an incentive contracting setting. The paper develops a multiperiod agency model in which nonfinancial performance indicators are shown to be valuable in providing the agent with desirable incentives. The relative importance of nonfinancial measures depends on the level of commitment that the principal and the agent can sustain. While long-term contracts are more efficient than short-term contracts, the analysis shows that a sequence of overlapping medium-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term contracts. In this discussion, I provide a brief review of the related streams of literature and discuss the paper’s contributions to them. The discussion also illustrates the intuition behind the paper’s main findings through a simple example and raises questions for future research.     

Consumer responses to offline and online low price signals: The role of cognitive elaboration

Low price signals (LPS), pricing tools where retailers promise to match or beat competitors' prices, have been increasingly popular in offline and online markets. We compare consumer evaluation of offline and online LPS as a function of how deeply they process the signals. Results of an experiment indicate that regardless of retail media consumers accept an LPS as an indicator of low price when they do not elaborate sufficiently on the signal. However, at high levels of elaboration, consumers challenge the assumptions underlying their acceptance of the signal at lower levels of elaboration whereby they become more skeptical of an online signal than an offline signal resulting in lower efficacy of the former. Implications of these findings for consumer vulnerability to false low price signaling are discussed along with other theoretical and managerial implications. Additionally, directions for future research are provided.     

Managing gray markets through tolerance of violations: a transaction cost perspective

Exclusive territory distribution arrangements are commonly observed in many markets. Once deployed, such arrangements are often subject to gray market activity, in the form of unauthorized sales which violate assigned restrictions. Interestingly, however, firms frequently choose to tolerate violations, rather than pursuing complete enforcement (i.e., by terminating violators) or abandoning exclusivity entirely. We draw from the literature on transaction cost economics to propose that tolerance of gray market activity is a function of a firm's ability to detect violations, and of the existence of credible threats and commitments. We also draw on the traditional literature on exclusive territories to suggest that minimizing distributor free-riding on services, which influences the decision to use exclusive territories in the first place, continues to be a concern after deployment. We collect micro-level data and test our predictions through a survey of managers who were responsible for the distribution decisions in their respective companies. Our results suggest that tolerance of violations is influenced both by transaction cost and free-riding considerations. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable, then all social choice functions can be implemented in strictly dominant strategies by a mechanism which does not use “integer/modulo games”. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation in the two-person case, and describe some implications of these characterization conditions.