An Equilibrium Model of Catastrophe Insurance Futures and Spreads

This article presents a valuation model of futures contracts and derivatives on such contracts, when the underlying delivery value is an insurance index, which follows a stochastic process containing jumps of random claim sizes at random time points of accident occurrence. Applications are made on insurance futures and spreads, a relatively new class of instruments for risk management launched by the Chicago Board of Trade in 1993, anticipated to start in Europe and perhaps also in other parts of the world in the future. The article treats the problem of pricing catastrophe risk, which is priced in the model and not treated as unsystematic risk. Several closed pricing formulas are derived, both for futures contracts and for futures derivatives, such as caps, call options, and spreads. The framework is that of partial equilibrium theory under uncertainty.     

Remote operation in environmentally sensitive areas: development of early warning indicators

Exploration and production of oil and gas in certain sensitive areas such as the Barents Sea and Lofoten is controversial and further expansion depends on the ability to avoid harmful spills. One way of improving the ability to avoid such spills is to use early warning indicators. The objective of the work presented in this paper is to describe and compare strengths and weaknesses of different approaches for the development of early warning indicators. The approaches that have been compared are: safety performance-based methods; risk-based methods; incident-based methods; and resilience-based methods. There are pros and cons with all methods. All methods are very favorable with respect to some characteristics and at the same time very unfavorable to some other characteristics. They are also different in terms of scope and depth of analysis. This suggests that we should be flexible with respect to the choice of methods, and preferably use more than one method. Thus, the main conclusion is that it is favorable to have the possibility to use several different methods for the establishment of early warning indicators.     

The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate

We compare the Nash bargaining solution in a reinsurance syndicate to the competitive equilibrium allocation, focusing on uncertainty and risk aversion. Restricting attention to proportional reinsurance treaties, we find that, although these solution concepts are very different, one may just appear as a first order Taylor series approximation of the other, in certain cases. This may be good news for the Nash solution, or for the equilibrium allocation, all depending upon one's point of view.

Our model also allows us to readily identify some properties of the equilibrium allocation not be shared by the bargaining solution, and vice versa, related to both risk aversions and correlations.     

Perspectives of Risk Sharing

In this paper we present an overview of the standard risk sharing model of insurance. We discuss and characterize a competitive equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and representative agent pricing, including its implications for insurance premiums. We only touch upon the existence problem of a competitive equilibrium, primarily by presenting several examples. Risk tolerance and aggregation is the subject of one section. Risk adjustment of the probability measure is one topic, as well as the insurance version of the capital asset pricing model. The competitive paradigm may be a little demanding in practice, so we alternatively present a game theoretic view of risk sharing, where solutions end up in the core. Properly interpreted, this may give rise to a range of prices of each risk, often visualized in practice by an ask price and a bid price. The nice aspect of this is that these price ranges can be explained by "first principles", not relying on transaction costs or other frictions. We also include a short discussion of moral hazard in risk sharing between an insurer and a prospective insurance buyer. We end the paper by indicating the implications of our results for a pure stock market. In particular we find it advantageous to discuss the concepts of incomplete markets in this general setting, where it is possible to use results for closed, convex subspaces of an L 2 -space to discuss optimal risk allocation problems in incomplete financial markets.     

Estimating the output gap in real time: A factor model approach

By using a dynamic factor model, we can substantially improve the reliability of real-time output gap estimates for the U.S. economy. First, we use a factor model to extract a series for the common component in GDP from a large panel of monthly real-time macroeconomic variables. This series is immune to revisions to the extent that revisions are due to unbiased measurement errors or idiosyncratic news. Second, our model is able to handle the unbalanced arrival of the data. This yields favorable nowcasting properties and thus starting conditions for the filtering of data into a trend and deviations from a trend. Combined with the method of augmenting data with forecasts prior to filtering, this greatly reduces the end-of-sample imprecision in the gap estimate. The increased precision has economic importance for real-time policy decisions and improves real-time inflation forecasts.     

Emissions Trading with Updated Allocation: Effects on Entry/Exit and Distribution

Allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects. It is well known that cost-efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner, e.g., based on emissions levels before the start of the system (‘grandfathering’). Böhringer and Lange (Eur Econ Rev 49:2041–2055, 2005) show that a cost-effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated (‘updating’), given that banking and borrowing are prohibited. In this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering, and how it affects profits for new and existing firms. We find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar: First, the incentives to entry and exit are identical. Second, the total value of free quotas to existing firms, based on emissions before the system starts, is also identical without any auctioning. With updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering, but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances. The two effects exactly cancel each other out. If there is some combination of auction and free allocation, the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same. Entry and exit incentives are still equal.     

An economic analysis of standards competition: The example of the ISO ODF and OOXML standards

The objective of this paper is to analyze economic efficiency considerations of standards competition, in order to thereby enrich the discussion about the transfer of the ECMA-376-1 (Office Open XML - OOXML) standard into the ISO/IEC 29500:2008 standard parallel to the already existing ISO/IEC 26300:2006 (Open Document Format for Office Applications - ODF) standard. Based on the available economic literature we identify parameters that need to be considered in the decision for or against a competition between competing standards. The characteristics in the specific case of competition between the ODF and the OOOXML standard clearly justify the decision for two documents standards.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

Egalitarian wage policies, unemployment and skill-biased technological change

A popular explanation for the rise in European unemployment during the past decades is that relative wages failed to adjust to changes in relative productivities. Many economists reject this hypothesis on the ground that the ratios of low- to high-skill unemployment did not increase. Building on a search model, I argue that relative unemployment rates are affected by skill-neutral, as well as skill-biased shocks; hence stable ratios are theoretically consistent with a mix of skill-biased and skill-neutral shocks. Yet, numerical exercises confirm that wage rigidity in the face of skill-biased shocks probably did not explain much of the European unemployment experience.