Can a Wealthy Economy Gain from an EU Membership? Adjustment Costs and Long Term Welfare Effects of Full Integration—The Norwegian Case

We employ a large scale macroeconometric model to study adjustment problems and long term welfare effects of a Norwegian EU-membership. Accession costs depend significantly on the country's level of GDP, the size of its agricultural sector and tariff and VAT revenues as these elements determine the net membership contribution. Without the transfers, integrating the economy into EU generates a small welfare gain. This result is strongly affected by a long period with under-utilisation of resources. With the net contribution included, we identify a welfare loss. This is especially so if fiscal policy is changed to maintain the public sector budgetary balance.     

What Do Current Account Reversals in OECD Countries Tell Us About the US Case?

This study examines macroeconomic developments around reversals in current account deficits in 29 OECD countries over four decades and draws some inferences for the present US deficit. Estimates of a probit model indicate that the deepness of the deficit itself, absence of spare production capacity and a beginning real depreciation are factors that increase the likelihood of a current account reversal in the following year. For the US each of these three indicators of a reversal are now on, making a near reversal probable. Over the past 40 years half of the current account deficit reversals in the OECD area were followed by a recession in the countries concerned.     

Ethnic Discrimination in Germany's Labour Market: A Field Experiment

Abstract. This paper studies ethnic discrimination in Germany's labour market with a correspondence test. We send two similar applications to each of 528 advertisements for student internships, one with a Turkish‐sounding and one with a German‐sounding name. A German name raises the average probability of a callback by about 14%. Differential treatment is particularly strong and significant in smaller firms at which the applicant with the German name receives 24% more callbacks. Discrimination disappears when we restrict our sample to applications including reference letters which contain favourable information about the candidate's personality. We interpret this finding as evidence for statistical discrimination.     

Determinants of County-Level Voting Patterns In the 2012 and 2016 Presidential Elections

ABSTRACT

County-level data are used to estimate the incumbent-party share of the two-party vote in the 2012 and the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. Using a ‘seemingly unrelated estimation’ procedure the regression results for the two elections show that there were some clear differences in the size of marginal effects for several key covariates. For example, income inequality, the size of the black male and black female populations, the size of the Hispanic male population and percent of the population with a college degree all had significantly larger coefficients in 2016 than in 2012, producing a larger marginal effect in favour of the Democratic candidate’s vote share. On the other hand, counties with increased poverty rates and counties located on the periphery of urban centres had a significantly larger marginal effect favouring the Republican’s vote share in 2016 compared to 2012. Finally, the regression results show that the effects of third-party vote shares, though not statistically different across the two elections, had a positive impact on the Democratic vote share in both elections.     

Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.